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Many observers in NATO and European Union (EU) countries hold that Russia is 
attempting to challenge the increasing Western influence in Central and Eastern Europe 
and reassert itself as a regional and global superpower. The 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict 
and the ongoing crisis in Ukraine provide evidence in support of this theory. Twelve 
Central and Eastern European nations have nonetheless joined NATO since 1999, and 
others have pledged their membership aspirations. This fact alone suggests that a general 
fear of Russian aggression persists among Central and Eastern European nations, and that 
NATO enlargement is both justified and welcomed. This thesis examines Georgia’s 
prospects for NATO membership and assesses U.S. strategic interests in this regard. To 
accomplish this, this thesis analyzes Georgia’s geostrategic importance and investigates 
links between Georgian and U.S. foreign policies as they relate to NATO enlargement. 
As regards Georgia, the key questions concern the extent to which the United States 
supports Tbilisi’s candidacy for Alliance membership, and whether the United States and 
its NATO Allies are willing to accept the risks and responsibilities that would be incurred 
with Georgia’s NATO membership. This thesis concludes that U.S. decisions regarding 
Georgia’s candidacy for NATO membership will be of critical importance. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This thesis examines Georgia’s prospects for NATO membership and provides 
insight into U.S. strategic interests in this regard. To accomplish this, this thesis analyzes 
Georgia’s geostrategic importance and investigates links between Georgian and U.S. 
foreign policies as they relate to NATO enlargement. Additionally, this thesis analyzes 
Georgia’s progress toward NATO membership as assessed by the Alliance, as well as 
related events that indirectly affect Georgia’s membership aspirations, such as the 
ongoing crisis in Ukraine and the increasing influence of the European Union (EU) in 
Central and Eastern Europe. This thesis investigates the hypothesis that U.S. decisions 
regarding Georgia’s candidacy for NATO membership will be of critical importance. 
A. SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS RESEARCH 
Strategically located in the Caucasus Mountains along the borders of present-day 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Russia, and Turkey, Georgia has historically served as an economic 
and military “land bridge” linking Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. Due to its strategic 
location on the eastern shore of the Black Sea, one empire after another has fought for, 
and conquered, Georgia—first the Romans, followed by the Persians, the Arabs, the 
Turks, the Mongols, the Ottomans, the Russians, and finally the Soviets. Prior to 1991, 
Georgia had witnessed a mere three years of independence in nearly 800 years (1918–
1921), the last 190 of which (with the exception of the above-mentioned three years) 
were under Russian, and later Soviet, control.1 
With the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991, Georgia officially 
gained its independence. However, since then, little has changed in the struggle for 
regional control. Not only has Georgia continued to serve as the “land bridge” between 
powerful actors, but Western influence has continued to increase as well, owing in part to 
post-Cold War containment of Russian influence and the growing involvement of 
Western companies in the South Caucasus energy market. Additionally, in the last 
1 “The World Factbook: Georgia,” Central Intelligence Agency, last accessed January 12, 2015, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gg.html, under “Introduction.” 
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decade, Georgia has served as a military transportation hub for the U.S.-led coalitions in 
Iraq and Afghanistan. These factors (and others) have prompted NATO and EU powers 
to strengthen their political ties with Georgia, to support Georgia’s membership in the 
World Trade Organization (WTO), and to consider its potential membership in NATO 
and the EU.2 
This increasing Western influence, however, has not been without contention, as 
witnessed in the 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict and subsequent Russian recognition of the 
breakaway Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which comprise 
approximately 20 percent of Georgia’s territory. Russian military forces have since 
increased their presence in these regions, and Berlin Wall-style barriers have been 
constructed along Abkhazia’s and South Ossetia’s borders with the part of Georgia not 
under Russian military control.3 When combined with Moscow’s signing of the Treaty on 
Alliance and Strategic Partnership with Abkhazia in November 20144 and the ongoing 
events in Ukraine (including Russia’s March 2014 annexation of Crimea),5 tensions 
between Russia and the NATO and EU powers have increased accordingly.6 The current 
perception among many NATO and EU powers is that Russia is attempting to challenge 
the increasing Western influence in Central and Eastern Europe and reassert itself as a 
regional and global superpower.7 This has led observers to question whether discord 
between Moscow and the West about Georgia’s quest for NATO and EU membership 
might become comparable to Cold War levels of antagonism.8 
2 Jim Nichol, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Political Developments and Implications for U.S. 
Interests (CRS Report No. RL33453) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, April 2, 2014), 
1–70. 
3 Ibid., 8. 
4 Federica Mogherini, “Statement,” European Union, November 24, 2014, 
http://www.eeas.europa.eu/statements-eeas/2014/141124_01_en.htm. 
5 Matt Smith and Alla Eshchenko, “Ukraine Cries ‘Robbery’ as Russia Annexes Crimea,” CNN, 
March 18, 2014, http://www.cnn.com/2014/03/18/world/europe/ukraine-crisis/. 
6 Natalia Zinets and Dmitry Madorsky, “U.S. Says Russia Must Pull Convoy from Ukraine or Face 
More Sanctions,” Reuters, August 22, 2014, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/08/22/uk-ukraine-crisis-
idUKKBN0GL1VH20140822. 
7 “Russia Profile,” BBC, Last accessed November 28, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-
17839672. 
8 Nichol, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, 1–65. 
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Critics of NATO enlargement contend that the induction of the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, and Poland into the Alliance in 1999, followed by Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia in 2004, and Albania and Croatia in 2009, 
has done little more than serve as a catalyst for a resurgent, and increasingly nationalist, 
Russian foreign policy.9 However, twelve Central and Eastern European nations have 
nonetheless joined the Alliance, and others have pledged their membership aspirations.10 
Furthermore, in June 2014, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine signed an Association 
Agreement with the EU.11 One might conclude from these facts alone that a general fear 
of Russian aggression persists among Central and Eastern European nations, and that 
NATO enlargement is not only justified, but also welcomed. As regards Georgia, the key 
questions that remain are as follows: To what extent does the United States support 
Tbilisi’s candidacy for Alliance membership? Are the United States and its NATO Allies 
willing to accept the additional risks and responsibilities that would be incurred with 
Georgia’s NATO membership? 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The current literature regarding Georgia’s prospects for NATO membership can 
be broken down into three categories. Within these categories, there is a general 
consensus that Georgia faces a number of significant challenges in its bid to join NATO, 
including Moscow’s recognition of the breakaway Georgian regions of Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia, Georgia’s faltering attempts at democratization, and Georgia’s need for 
additional defense reforms. Additionally, there is a general consensus that Moscow’s 
current leadership has demonstrated its resolve to prevent continued NATO enlargement 
into Russia’s historic sphere of influence, and that any future attempt at NATO 
9 James Kirchick, “Russia Hasn’t Been ‘Encircled’ by the West: Vladimir Putin Simply Wants to be 
Able to Invade His Neighbors at Will,” BBC, April 8, 2014, 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/04/08/nato_expansion_didnt_set_off_the_ukrainian_crisis. 
10 “A Short History of NATO,” NATO, last accessed January 28, 2015, 
http://www.nato.int/history/nato-history.html. 
11 “EU Forges Closer Ties with Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova,” European Union, June 27, 2014, 
http://eeas.europa.eu/top_stories/2014/270614_association_agreement_en.htm. 
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enlargement in the post-Communist space will be accompanied by an increase in Russian 
opposition. 
The first category of literature consists largely of official documents from NATO 
and the Government of Georgia, and officially-sponsored studies, notably works by the 
Congressional Research Service (CRS).  This literature generally focuses on assessing 
Georgia’s quantifiable progress toward meeting NATO membership requirements. Since 
1994, when Georgia joined the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, Georgia has actively 
pursued reforms in areas such as democratization and defense. However, owing in part to 
economic, military, and political realities inherent in former Soviet states, these reforms 
have been slow and subject to frequent setbacks. Georgia has nonetheless maintained its 
commitment to achieving NATO membership, as is evident by Georgia’s continued 
support of coalition operations in Kosovo with the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) and 
in Afghanistan with the NATO-led RESOLUTE SUPPORT,12 as well as by its pledge to 
provide continued “financial support for the long-term sustainment of the Afghan 
National Security Forces.”13 
As regards membership criteria, according to the 1995 Study on NATO 
Enlargement, there are no rigid criteria for joining the Alliance. However, there are 
certain conditions that can hinder or prevent membership accession, such as unresolved 
territorial disputes, failures in democratization, or an unreformed defense institution.14 In 
this regard, with the 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict and subsequent Russian occupation of 
the breakaway Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Georgia’s membership 
12 Jim Nichol, Georgia [Republic] and NATO Enlargement: Issues and Implication (CRS Report No. 
RS22829) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, March 6, 2009), 1–12; Jim Nichol, Russia-
Georgia Conflict in August 2008: Context and Implications for U.S. Interests (CRS Report No. RL34618) 
(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, March 3, 2009), 1–39; Jim Nichol, Georgia 
[Republic]: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests (CRS Report No. 97–727) (Washington, DC: 
Congressional Research Service, June 21, 2013), 1–43; Nichol, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, 1–70; 
Adriana Skorupska and Konrad Zasztowt, “Georgia’s Local Government Reform: How to Escape from the 
Soviet Past (and How Poland Can Help),” The Polish Institute of International Affairs, No. 4 (87) 
(February 2014), http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/Georgias_Path_to_NATO.pdf, 1–6. 
13 “NATO-Georgia Relations,” NATO, June 2014, 
http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2014_06/20140602_140602-Media-
Backgrounder_Georgia_en.pdf. 
14 “Study on NATO Enlargement,” NATO, November 5, 2008, 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_24733.htm, under Chapter 1.b.7. 
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aspirations suffered a major setback.15 Since then, however, tensions between Tbilisi and 
Moscow have stabilized, and, owing in part to financial and military assistance provided 
by individual NATO and EU member states, Georgia has continued to implement 
necessary democratization and defense reforms. It remains to be seen if Georgia will find 
a political resolution to its territorial disputes. However, should these disputes be 
resolved, Georgia’s primary membership obstacle would (in theory) no longer be a factor. 
Given Georgia’s dedication and progress toward meeting NATO conditions, with 
continued assistance from individual member states, notably the United States, some 
observers maintain that Georgia will eventually achieve NATO membership.16 In 2013, 
Anders Fogh Rasmussen, then the NATO Secretary General, said, “if you [Georgians] 
continue your efforts, and with our help, Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic integration will only be 
a matter of time.”17 
The second category of literature focuses on how individual NATO member 
states are not ready for Georgia to become a member due primarily to the associated risk 
of provoking a conflict with Russia, but also due to ongoing economic recession and 
political turmoil in NATO and EU member states.18 Since the 2008 Russia-Georgia 
conflict, Russia’s increasingly aggressive foreign policy has openly challenged the status 
quo. From its deliberate conduct of deniable “hybrid” warfare in Ukraine19 to its 
politicized attempts to create organizational rivals to NATO,20 the International 
15 Nichol, Russia-Georgia Conflict in August 2008, 1–39; Damon Wilson, “Georgia’s Path to NATO,” 
Atlantic Council, February 2014, 
http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/Georgias_Path_to_NATO.pdf, 1–6. 
16 Nichol, Georgia [Republic]: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests, 1–43. 
17 Anders Fogh Rasmussen, “NATO and Georgia—On the Right Path” (speech, National Library of 
Georgia in Tbilisi, Georgia, June 27, 2013), http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_101755.htm. 
18 Liz Alderman and Alison Smale, “Divisions Grow as a Downturn Rocks Europe,” The New York 
Times, August 29, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/30/business/international/European-economy-
tries-to-find-its-way.html?_r=0.  
19 “Hybrid War–Hybrid Response?,” NATO, last accessed January 28, 2015, 
http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2014/russia-ukraine-nato-crisis/Russia-Ukraine-crisis-war/EN/index.htm. 
20 Alexander Yakovenko, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Allies of a New Type,” RT, 
September 12, 2014, http://rt.com/op-edge/187360-sco-economic-humanitarian-cooperation. 
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Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank (WB),21 Russia has continued to challenge 
the West’s power and legitimacy. While the threat of Russian aggression has increased, 
the ongoing economic recession has prompted most NATO member states to reduce 
defense expenditures,22 thus decreasing NATO’s overall ability to defend itself militarily 
against Russia. 
According to the NATO website, 
the effects of the [global] financial crisis and the declining share of 
resources devoted to defence in many Allied countries have exacerbated 
this imbalance [that is, NATO’s over-reliance on the United States for 
essential defense capabilities] and also revealed growing asymmetries in 
capability among European Allies. France, Germany, and the United 
Kingdom together represent more than 50 per cent of the non-U.S. Allies 
defence spending, which creates another kind of over-reliance within 
Europe on a few capable European Allies. Furthermore, their defence 
spending is under increasing pressure, as is that of the United States, to 
meet deficit and indebtedness reduction targets.23 
 
When combined with recurrent secessionist campaigns in the United Kingdom (Scotland) 
and Spain (Catalonia),24 the implications for the Eurozone of the results of the 2015 
Greek Parliamentary elections,25 and the U.S. pivot to the Asia-Pacific,26 it would appear 
overall that there is little political willingness among NATO and EU member states to 
face off militarily against Russia. 
21 Jon Hartley, “The BRICS Bank is Born Out of Politics,” Forbes, July 28, 2014, 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/jonhartley/2014/07/28/the-brics-bank-is-born-out-of-politics. 
22 “NATO Funding,” NATO, last accessed January 28, 2015, 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_67655.htm, under “Voluntary Indirect Funding of NATO.” 
23 Ibid. 
24 “Scottish Referendum: Scotland Votes ‘No’ to Independence,” BBC, September 19, 2014, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-scotland-29270441; “Catalonia Vote: 80% Back Independence - Officials,” 
BBC, November 10, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-29982960. 
25 Dennis Lynch, “Greek Election Results 2015: Syriza Wins by Comfortable Margin in Historic 
Elections,” International Business Times, January 25, 2015, http://www.ibtimes.com/greek-election-results-
2015-syriza-wins-comfortable-margin-historic-elections-1794076. 
26 Kurt Campbell (Assistant Secretary, Department of State), interview by Robert Kagan, last accessed 
January 12, 2015, transcript, The Foreign Policy Initiative, http://www.foreignpolicyi.org/content/obama-
administrations-pivot-asia. 
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The third category of literature focuses on how Moscow regards Georgia as 
within its historic sphere of influence and on Moscow’s resolve to prevent continued 
NATO enlargement and “bring about a less U.S./Western-centric system.”27 According 
to Moscow, since the collapse of the Soviet Union, continued NATO and EU 
enlargement has not only been unwarranted, but has also threatened the economic and 
territorial integrity of Russia. From this perspective, Moscow’s actions in Georgia and 
Ukraine are justified.28 Within this category of literature, however, there are varying 
opinions about whether Moscow’s actions positively or negatively affect Georgia’s 
membership aspirations. While to some extent Moscow’s actions in Georgia29 and 
Ukraine30 have served to revitalize the Alliance, thus making Georgia’s membership 
more likely, its actions have also exposed NATO’s weakness—the challenge of achieving 
consensus.31 It remains to be seen whether the Alliance will reach consensus in support 
of Georgia’s bid to join NATO. 
While the current literature offers valuable insight into Georgia and its progress 
toward, and likelihood of obtaining, NATO membership, it generally fails to look at 
Georgia (and the world) from a historical perspective. Since the days of the Roman 
Empire, the Caucasus has served as a battleground between competing ethnicities and 
ideologies, each trying to assert its dominance over an increasingly geostrategic region.32 
Today’s contest between Russia and NATO is arguably comparable. 
27 Dmitri Trenin, “Russia’s Spheres of Interest, Not Influence,” The Washington Quarterly 32:4 
(October 2009): 
http://home.comcast.net/~lionelingram/555_Russias_Sphere_of_Interest_09oct_Trenin.pdf, 5. 
28 Gabrielle Tétrault-Farber, “Shoigu Says NATO and Terrorism Russia’s Top Challenges,” The 
Moscow Times, November 11, 2013, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/shoigu-says-nato-and-
terrorism-russias-top-challenges/489311.html. 
29 Nichol, Russia-Georgia Conflict in August 2008, 1–39. 
30 “Hybrid War–Hybrid Response?” 
31 Damon Wilson, “A U.S. Strategy for Europe’s East,” RT, November 13, 2013, 
http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/a-us-strategy-for-europe-s-east.  
32 “The World Factbook: Georgia,” under “Introduction.” 
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C. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
As regards the likelihood of Georgia obtaining NATO membership, two 
hypotheses must be examined. The first is that Georgia will obtain membership; however, 
the most important aspect of this hypothesis is not that membership will occur, but rather 
when it will occur and under what circumstances. According to the 1995 Study on NATO 
Enlargement, there are no rigid criteria for achieving NATO membership. Rather, all that 
is ultimately required is consensus among existing members.33 However, this is where 
matters become gray. NATO decisions regarding the accession of West Germany into the 
Alliance in 1955 set the precedent for granting NATO membership to an aspiring nation 
with unresolved territorial disputes.34 Similarly, NATO’s vague definitions of 
democratization and defense reforms leave room for interpretation.35 In effect, Georgia’s 
prospects for achieving NATO membership have less to do with its ongoing disputes and 
domestic reforms than with the willingness of NATO member states to accept additional 
risks and responsibilities. Thus, the question becomes, at what point would NATO 
member states be willing to accept the risks and responsibilities associated with allowing 
Georgia to join the Alliance? With an increasingly aggressive Russian foreign policy 
threatening not only the sovereignty and territorial integrity of non-NATO Eastern 
European nations,36 but also Europe’s access to Russian and Azeri energy,37 some 
observers contend that it is only a matter of time before NATO will be forced to act, be 
that through economic, military, or political means. Given Georgia’s current progress 
toward meeting membership conditions, with continued U.S. support for Tbilisi’s 
candidacy, Georgian membership may eventually be achieved. 
The second hypothesis is that Georgia will never obtain NATO membership. With 
several NATO member states currently suffering from economic recession and political 
33 “Study on NATO Enlargement,” under Chapter 1.b.7. 
34 “A Short History of NATO,” under “A Treaty for Our Age.” 
35 “Study on NATO Enlargement,” under Chapter 5.b and 5.d. 
36 Nichol, Russia-Georgia Conflict in August 2008, 1–39; Smith and Eshchenko, “Ukraine Cries 
‘Robbery.’” 
37 Nichol, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, 1–70; Natalia Zinets, “Ukraine Warns Europe of 
Russian Gas Cut-Off: Moscow Denies,” Reuters, August 27, 2014, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/08/27/us-ukraine-crisis-gas-idUSKBN0GR0W120140827. 
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turmoil,38 it appears that the only point the Alliance is able to achieve consensus on is its 
unwillingness to provoke a conflict with Russia over a peripheral country that, some 
observers argue, offers little more than an insecure hub for energy and logistics. 
D. RESEARCH DESIGN 
Evidence to support this thesis has been obtained primarily via an in-depth case 
study of Georgia. The purpose of this case study is to investigate links between Georgian 
and U.S. foreign policies as they relate to NATO enlargement and to examine Georgia’s 
prospects for NATO membership. This has been accomplished primarily by examining 
official documents from NATO and the Government of Georgia, officially-sponsored 
studies (notably works by the Congressional Research Service), research by prominent 
international scholars, and statements by NATO and by government officials from 
Georgia and the United States. Analyzing these sources has clarified overlapping 
objectives and long-term goals, as well as individual and national positions. 
E. THESIS OVERVIEW 
Chapter II of this thesis provides an historical overview of Georgia’s 
demographic, economic, political, and military situation, including Georgia’s WTO 
accession, natural resource capacity, and strategic location within the Eurasian Transport 
Corridor for energy resources. Chapter III of this thesis analyzes U.S. strategic interests 
in Georgia and how these interests have shaped, and will probably continue to influence, 
Georgia’s domestic and foreign policies. Primary U.S. strategic interests in Georgia 
include post-Cold War containment of Russian influence, Georgia’s path to 
democratization, the build-up of Georgia’s national and collective defense capacity, and 
the Eurasian Transport Corridor.39 This chapter focuses on financial and security 
assistance provided by the United States, Georgia’s military contributions to operations 
38 Alderman and Smale, “Divisions Grow.” 
39 Nichol, Georgia [Republic] and NATO Enlargement, 1–12; Nichol, Russia-Georgia Conflict in 
August 2008, 1–39; Nichol, Georgia [Republic]: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests, 1–43; Nichol, 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, 1–70. 
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authorized by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and led by NATO, and the 
U.S.-Georgia Charter on Strategic Partnership. 
Chapter IV of this thesis offers a brief overview of the 1995 Study on NATO 
Enlargement. This chapter also analyzes Georgia’s motivations for, and progress toward, 
NATO membership, as well as several ongoing issues that could undermine Georgia’s 
prospects for NATO membership. These issues include Georgia’s unresolved territorial 
disputes in Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia, Georgia’s faltering 
democratization, and Georgia’s need for additional defense reforms. 
Chapter V of this thesis offers conclusions. 
 10 
II. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF GEORGIA 
This chapter discusses several aspects of Georgia, including its demography, 
economy, energy, World Trade Organization status, politics, and the military. 
A. DEMOGRAPHY 
According to a census conducted in July 2014, the population of Georgia, 
excluding the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, was approximately 
4,935,880. Geographically limited by the greater Caucasus Mountains to the north and 
the lesser Caucasus Mountains to the south, the majority of Georgia’s population lives 
along the western border (adjacent to the Black Sea), and along the east-west running 
valley extending through the center of the country toward Tbilisi (the capital) and 
Azerbaijan. As of 2011, approximately 52.8 percent of Georgia’s population lives in 
major cities such as Tbilisi, Kutaisi, Batumi, and Rustavi, with approximately 25 percent 
living in Tbilisi alone (1.175 million). Between 120,000 and 200,000 people live in 
Kutaisi, Batumi, and Rustavi, respectively. Of note, Batumi is the capital of the 
Autonomous Republic of Adjara, a region located in southwest Georgia along the border 
of Turkey and adjacent to the Black Sea.40 
According to a census conducted in 2002, Georgia is comprised primarily of 
ethnic Georgians (83.8 percent). The majority of non-Georgian ethnic groups, such as the 
Azeris (6.5 percent), Armenians (5.7 percent), and Russians (1.5 percent), live in the 
center of the country along the north-south running transportation corridor (river and 
railway), as does the large South Ossetian population in the center north. While Georgia’s 
official language is Georgian, only 71 percent of the population speaks Georgian. Ethnic 
Russians comprise a mere 1.5 percent of the population; however, the percentage of 
Russian speakers is 9 percent, with Azeri and Armenian speakers comprising 13 percent 
of the population. Since the 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict, Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
have each changed their official languages (Abkhaz and Ossetian, respectively); however, 
the majority of their populations speak Georgian. When viewed on a map, these facts 
40 “The World Factbook: Georgia,” under “People and Society.” 
 11 
                                                 
effectively split Georgia down the center into two ethnic and linguistic Georgian halves, 
with minority groups controlling the center.41 
According to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), in 2014, the average life 
expectancy in Georgia was 75.72 years42 (79.4 for females and 70.2 for males43). This 
relatively long life expectancy can be largely attributed not only to Georgia’s continuous 
dedication of a large portion of its gross domestic product (GDP) to health expenditures 
(9.4 percent in 2011), but also to improvements in the purification of drinking water and 
sanitation facilities. Both of these factors have also significantly reduced Georgia’s 
childhood mortality rate.44 
That being said, since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Georgia’s population 
growth has steadily declined.45 Between 2008 and 2012, the use of hormonal 
contraceptives increased by approximately 99.7 percent.46 As of 2010, 53.4 percent of 
women between the ages of 15 and 44 use some form of contraceptive.47  With a fertility 
rate of 1.77 children born per woman, Georgia’s population growth rate is negative 
0.11 percent (as of 2014), ranking Georgia 206 out of 233 nations surveyed with the 
smallest population growth rate.48 According to the National Statistics Office of Georgia, 
this translates into a significantly smaller population younger than 20 years of age 
compared to those between the ages of 20 and 29.49 With 33.8 percent of the population 
41 “The World Factbook: Georgia,” under “People and Society.” 
42 Ibid. 
43  The World Bank, “The World Bank Group–Georgia Partnership Program Snapshot,” October 
2014, http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/Georgia-Snapshot.pdf, 10. 
44 “The World Factbook: Georgia,” under “People and Society.” 
45 Ibid. 
46 National Statistics Office of Georgia, “Women and Men in Georgia: Statistical Publication,” 2013, 
http://www.geostat.ge/cms/site_images/_files/english/health/women%20and%20men%202013-
Analytical.pdf, 19. 
47 “The World Factbook: Georgia,” under “People and Society.” 
48 Ibid. 
49  National Statistics Office of Georgia, “Population,” last accessed February 5, 2015, 
http://geostat.ge/index.php?action=page&p_id=473&lang=eng. 
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between the ages of 20 and 24 (and 14.6 percent of the total population) unemployed50 
and 9.7 percent of the population below the poverty line (as of 2013),51 it is likely that a 
large portion of Georgia’s future elderly population will lack long-term financial security.  
As of 2014, Georgia is one of the poorest of the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS) countries.52 
B. ECONOMY 
According to the National Statistics Office of Georgia and the CIA, in 2013, 
9.4 percent of Georgia’s GDP originated from agriculture, such as the cultivation  
of grapes, citrus fruits and hazelnuts. In comparison, 73 percent of Georgia’s GDP 
originated from services, such as energy logistics and tourism. The remaining 
17.6 percent was derived from small-scale industry, such as the production of alcoholic 
and nonalcoholic beverages, metals, machinery, and chemicals, as well as the mining of 
manganese, copper, and gold.53 However, according to the CIA, in 2006, 55.6 percent of 
Georgia’s labor force was employed in agriculture, compared to 35.5 percent in services 
and 8.9 percent in industry. This disparity in sectoral employment—more than half of the 
population is employed in agriculture—has resulted in a continued rise in income 
inequality among Georgia’s population.54 
According to the National Statistics Office of Georgia, Georgia’s major exports 
include motor cars, Ferro-alloys, copper ores, nuts, and wine, the majority of which  
(51 percent) go to CIS countries. In 2014, Azerbaijan accounted for 19 percent of 
Georgia’s exports, while Armenia, Russia, Turkey, and the United States accounted for 
10 percent, 10 percent, 8 percent, and 7 percent, respectively. In terms of imports, 
50 National Statistics Office of Georgia, “Employment and Unemployment,” last accessed February 4, 
2015, http://www.geostat.ge/index.php?action=page&p_id=146&lang=eng. 
51  National Statistics Office of Georgia, “Living Conditions,” last accessed February 4, 2015, 
http://www.geostat.ge/index.php?action=page&p_id=188&lang=eng. 
52  The World Bank, “The World Bank Group,” 9. 
53 National Statistics Office of Georgia, “Gross Domestic Product of Georgia: 2013,” November 17, 
2014, http://geostat.ge/cms/site_images/_files/english/nad/pres-relizi_2013_ENG_daz.pdf; “The World 
Factbook: Georgia,” under Economy. 
54 “The World Factbook: Georgia,” under “Economy.” 
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Georgia primarily receives petroleum, motor cars, gases, medicaments, and telephones, 
roughly half of which (47 percent) come from non-CIS and non-EU countries. In 2014, 
Turkey accounted for 20 percent of Georgia’s imports, while China, Azerbaijan, Russia, 
and Ukraine accounted for 9 percent, 7 percent, 6 percent, and 6 percent, respectively.55 
Prior to the 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict, 
Georgia’s economy sustained GDP growth of more than 10% in 2006–07, 
based on strong inflows of foreign investment and robust government 
spending. However, GDP growth slowed . . . and sunk to negative 4% in 
2009 as foreign direct investment [FDI] and workers’ remittances declined 
in the wake of the global financial crisis. The economy rebounded in 
2010–13, but FDI inflows, the engine of Georgian economic growth prior 
to the 2008 conflict, have not recovered fully.56 
According to the National Statistics Office of Georgia, Georgia’s real growth rate peaked 
at 12.6 percent in 2007; however, in 2008 and 2009, it dropped to 2.6 percent and 
negative 3.7 percent, respectively.57 Thanks to international aid pledges for Georgia’s 
rebuilding,58 Georgia’s real growth rate climbed to 6.2 percent and 7.2 percent in  
2010 and 2011, respectively. Between 2012 and 2013, Georgia’s real growth rate slowed 
to 6.4 percent and 3.3 percent, respectively, marking a gradual decline.59 
In terms of tax revenue, “Georgia has historically suffered from chronic failure to 
collect.”60 In 2004, the Georgian government took steps that “simplified the tax code, 
improved tax administration, increased tax enforcement, and cracked down on petty 
corruption.”61 Additionally, the government reformed the traffic police and implemented 
a fair examination system for entering the university system. In doing so, the Georgian 
government not only succeeded in increasing tax revenue, but through continued 
55 National Statistics Office of Georgia, “External Trade.” last accessed February 4, 2015, 
http://www.geostat.ge/index.php?action=page&p_id=137&lang=eng. 
56 There are currently over 1 million migrant Georgian workers living in Russia. Nichol, Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, and Georgia, 12; “The World Factbook: Georgia,” under Economy. 
57 National Statistics Office of Georgia, “Gross Domestic Product of Georgia: 2013.” 
58 Nichol, Georgia [Republic] and NATO Enlargement, 4–5. 
59 National Statistics Office of Georgia, “Gross Domestic Product of Georgia: 2013.” 
60 “The World Factbook: Georgia,” under “Economy.” 
61 Ibid. 
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enforcement, hopes to attract additional “foreign investment [as well], with a focus on 
hydropower, agriculture, tourism, and textiles production.”62 “In 2014, the World Bank 
assessed Georgia as having made the most progress among 189 countries over the period 
since 2005 in making business regulatory reforms and 15th worldwide in the overall ease 
of doing business.”63 Georgia currently ranks first out of 26 Eastern European and 
Central Asian countries in the overall ease of doing business.64 Additionally, according 
to Transparency International’s 2014 report, Georgia ranked first out of 19 Eastern 
European and Central Asian countries on the Corruption Perception Index, and 50th 
worldwide. That is, Georgia was perceived as the least corrupt of the 19 Eastern 
European and Central Asian countries rated, but more corrupt than 49 other countries in a 
global comparison involving 175 countries.65 
C. ENERGY 
Georgia has historically imported nearly all of its natural gas and oil products 
from Russia. However, due to financial assistance provided largely by the United States 
and the United Kingdom, as well as Georgia’s increasing efforts to either refurbish its 
existing hydroelectric power plants or build new ones, Georgia is now able to meet nearly 
all of its domestic energy requirements without depending on Russia.66 That being said, 
according to the World Bank, Georgia “still relies on seasonal electricity exchanges with 
a single neighboring country [Azerbaijan], which undermines the security of its supplies 
and poses a risk of seasonal electricity shortages.”67 However, by shifting its imports 
toward Azerbaijan, Georgia has been able to reduce its dependence on Russian energy 
resources and limit the effects of Russian-induced gas supply interruptions.68  
62 “The World Factbook: Georgia,” under “Economy.” 
63 Ministry of Economy and Sustainable Development of Georgia, “Doing Business 2015: Going 
Beyond Efficiency,” 12th Edition, 2014, 
http://economy.ge/uploads/ek_ciprebshi/reitingebi/reitingebi_eng/Doing_Business_2015_eng_1.pdf, 2. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Transparency International, “Corruption Perceptions Index 2014,” 2014, 
http://economy.ge/uploads/ek_ciprebshi/english/CPI_2014-_ENG.pdf. 
66 Nichol, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, 53–54. 
67  The World Bank, “The World Bank Group,” 14. 
68 Nichol, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, 53–54. 
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As part of the Eurasian Transport Corridor, Georgia maintains strategic 
significance to world powers, particularly Russia, the United States, and European 
nations. According to Richard Morningstar, then the U.S. Special Envoy for Eurasian 
Energy, “U.S. policy encourages the development of new Eurasian oil and gas resources 
to increase the diversity of world energy supplies,”69 thereby allowing European 
countries to diminish their energy dependence on Russia.70 Construction of the Baku-
Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzerum gas pipeline (both completed in 
2006), as well as the construction of the Kars-Akhalkalaki Railroad (scheduled for 
completion in 2014), “are part of a [Georgian and U.S.] strategy to capitalize on 
Georgia’s strategic location between Europe and Asia and develop its role as a transit 
point [between Azerbaijan and Europe] for gas, oil, and other goods.”71 Additionally, the 
expansion of the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzerum pipeline, “as part of the Shah Deniz II Southern 
Gas Corridor project [with Azerbaijan], will result in a $2 billion foreign investment in 
Georgia, the largest ever in the country. Gas from Shah Deniz II is expected to begin 
flowing [to Georgia] in 2019,”72 and eventually to Europe. 
D. GEORGIA AND THE WTO 
In 1994, members of the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT) granted 
Georgia observer status. The following year, however, the GATT transformed into the 
WTO, and a new negotiations process became necessary. In June 1996, Georgia applied 
for membership to the WTO and expressed its desire to become a full member. Later that 
year, Georgia received observer status in the WTO. Over the next three years, a series of 
multi-lateral and bi-lateral negotiations took place between Georgia and 30 member 
states, during which details were worked out regarding “rates of coherent tariffs on 
imports of goods, conditions of access to the commodity markets and obligations in the 
69 Nichol, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, 54. 
70 Ibid. 
71 “The World Factbook: Georgia,” under “Economy.” 
72 Ibid. 
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services trade field.”73 On 6 October 1999, the WTO General Council signed the protocol 
on the accession of Georgia to the WTO. On 20 April 2000, the Georgian government 
ratified the protocol, and on 14 June 2000, Georgia became the 137th member of the 
WTO.74 
As a full member, Georgia was in the position of considering whether to approve 
Russia’s 2011 bid for WTO membership; however, concerns over market access along 
Georgia’s border with Russia (including the breakaway regions) quickly became points 
of contention. In keeping with the 1994 free trade agreement signed by Georgia and 
Russia75 (placed under review in July 2014 for suspension by Russia’s Ministry for 
Economic Development76), Georgia and the WTO argued that Georgia should establish 
customs clearance posts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia to increase the transparency of 
cross-border trade. However, Russia refused to resolve these concerns, claiming that the 
establishment of these posts was unrelated to WTO accession and political in nature. On 
9 November 2011, Georgia and Russia signed a trade monitoring agreement that “cleared 
on of the last major obstacles to Russia being invited to join the WTO.”77 According to 
the CRS Report by Jim Nichol, 
the trade monitoring agreement calls for customs observers at three ‘trade 
corridors’ on the Georgia-Russia border, two running through the 
breakaway regions and the third running through the uncontested Zemo 
Larsi-Kazbegi border crossing. In regard to the breakaway regions, a 
terminal will be located at Russia’s border with the region, and another at 
Georgia’s border with the region. A private firm will be hired and 
managed by Switzerland to check statistics on customs clearance. Georgia 
and Russia will provide data to the firm, which will forward the data to the 
WTO.78 
73 “Georgia and WTO,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, Government of Georgia, last accessed 
January 28, 2015, http://mfa.gov.ge/index.php?lang_id=ENG&sec_id=548. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Nichol, Georgia [Republic]: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests, 13. 
76 Liz Fuller, “Russia Hits Back at Georgia over Trade Agreement with European Union,” Radio Free 
Europe: Radio Liberty, August 2, 2014, http://www.rferl.org/content/georgia-russia-eu-agreement-free-
trade/25478788.html. 
77 Nichol, Georgia [Republic]: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests, 13. 
78 Ibid. 
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Russia became a full member of the WTO in August 2012.79 
E. POLITICS 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991 and the subsequent 
fleeing of the then-president of Georgia, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, former Soviet Foreign 
Minister Eduard Shevardnadze assumed control of Georgia. Initially chosen as head of 
the ruling State Council in January 1992, and later as speaker of the legislature in late 
1992, Shevardnadze became Georgia’s president in 1995. However, between 1992 and 
1995, Georgia underwent intense secessionist conflict in the Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
regions, which largely negated the democratic and economic reforms implemented during 
his rule.80 After eight years in office, “mounting public discontent over rampant 
corruption and ineffective government services, followed by an attempt by the incumbent 
Georgian Government to manipulate national legislative elections in November 2003 
touched off widespread protests that led to the resignation of Eduard Shevardnadze.”81 
This so-called “Rose Revolution” led to new elections, after which the U.S.-educated 
Mikheil Saakashvili became the first democratically-elected president of Georgia.82 
Under President Saakashvili’s rule, the Georgian government began taking steps 
toward decentralization and democratization. In 2004, the Georgian government ratified 
the European Charter on Local Self Government, a Council of Europe document 
designed to promote “the idea of local government as a basic element of democracy, and 
emphas[ize] the inclusion of the citizens in local democracy.”83 Two years later, in 2006, 
the Georgian government undertook radical reforms to consolidate Georgian territory 
from 1,000 small local units to 69 larger units. However, reformers failed to take on the 
issue of financial and political emancipation for local governments, which was a crucial 
factor for Georgia’s democratization. Considering that there were no legal mechanisms in 
place to ensure a fair distribution of state resources, local governments remained 
79 Nichol, Georgia [Republic]: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests, 13. 
80 Ibid., 1. 
81 “The World Factbook: Georgia,” under “Introduction.” 
82 Nichol, Georgia [Republic]: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests, 1. 
83 Skorupska and Zasztowt, “Georgia’s Local Government Reform,” 2. 
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financially dependent on central authorities. This dependency gave central authorities 
leverage to persuade local electorates to vote for the ruling party. Ironically, according to 
opinion polls, more than half of all Georgians stated that they were unaware of these 
reforms.84 
In further attempts to reform local government, the Georgian government drafted 
legislation for the establishment of five self-governing cities, each with locally-elected 
mayors, as well as for the “direct election of the governors of the nine regions of Georgia, 
and of the heads of local municipalities.”85 However, due to internal opposition, Tbilisi 
became the only Georgian city to assume this new organizational structure, whereas other 
cities could now elect local councilors, who would then elect mayors. “Provincial 
governors remained as presidential appointments, made in agreement with [the] Prime 
Minister.”86 While further reforms were brought to Parliament in 2012 designed to create 
additional self-governing cities and increase the accountability of regional governors, 
these too were either marginalized or defeated by internal opposition.87 In effect, the 
2006 reforms demonstrated that Georgia was moving “toward centralization, rather than 
decentralization.”88 
In November 2007, a “government crackdown on political oppositionists led 
Saakashvili to step down as president in the face of domestic and international criticism 
to seek a mandate on his continued rule. He was reelected president in January 2008 with 
53% of the vote.”89 In August 2008, however, Russia invaded Georgia and quickly 
defeated the Georgian military. Russia’s subsequent recognition of the breakaway 
Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states prompted 
Saakashvili to introduce “new democratization initiatives as a means to strengthen 
Georgia’s sovereignty and independence and thereby prevent Russia from subverting 
84 Skorupska and Zasztowt, “Georgia’s Local Government Reform,” 2–3. 
85 Ibid., 3. 
86 Ibid. 
87 Ibid., 2–3. 
88 Ibid., 3. 
89 Nichol, Georgia [Republic]: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests, 1. 
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Georgia’s statehood.”90 These initiatives included reforms in agriculture, trade, 
employment, infrastructure development, and tourism.91 
In October 2011, billionaire philanthropist Bidzina Ivanishvili entered into 
politics, bringing the divided opposition together under his Georgian Dream (GD) 
coalition.92 The result was an intense political standoff between Saakashvili and 
Ivanishvili involving issues such as citizenship and political contributions. Under 
President Saakashvili, the government sought to bar Ivanishvili from running for political 
office, and began seizing Ivanishvili’s financial assets. Amendments to the constitution 
were approved that limited campaign contributions; however, observers viewed this as a 
way of constricting Ivanishvili’s new party. After nearly six months of political tension, 
multi-million dollar fines, and the seizure of numerous telecommunication assets and 
facilities owned by the Ivanishvili family,93 GD won a majority of seats in the October 
2012 “parliamentary election and removed UNM [United National Movement] from 
power. Conceding defeat, Saakashvili named Ivanishvili as prime minister and allowed 
Georgian Dream to create a new government.”94 
Under Ivanishvili, the government sought to introduce “‘large-scale reforms in all 
strategic directions,’ including changing the constitution to bolster parliamentary power, 
restructuring the Interior (police) Ministry and depoliticizing the Interior and Defense 
Ministries, promulgating a new national security strategy, and modernizing the 
economy.”95 Furthermore, the Georgian government also proclaimed that “the United 
States is Georgia’s main ally and that foreign policy objectives include EU and 
NATO.”96 Over the next several months, however, the new government began arresting 
UNM party officials, a move that many U.S. and EU officials deemed politically 
90 Nichol, Georgia [Republic]: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests, 1. 
91 Ibid., 1–2. 
92 “The World Factbook: Georgia,” under “Introduction.” 
93 Nichol, Georgia [Republic]: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests, 4. 
94 “The World Factbook: Georgia,” under “Introduction.” 
95 Nichol, Georgia [Republic]: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests, 8. 
96 Ibid. 
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motivated.97 Additionally, “many heads of municipalities affiliated with Saakashvili’s 
party were sacked by members of local councils. Half of them very quickly switched 
allegiance from UNM to GD, which demonstrate[d] their total political dependence on 
central government.”98 
The result was an intense political standoff between President Saakashvili and 
Prime Minister Ivanishvili that culminated in the dismissal of the First Deputy Prime 
Minister and Ivanishvili physically preventing President Saakashvili’s State-of-Nation 
Address to Parliament.99 “In late March 2013, GD convinced enough UNM legislators to 
join in a two-thirds majority vote to amend the constitution to take away President 
Saakashvili’s power to dismiss the sitting cabinet and to appoint a new cabinet without 
parliamentary approval. He [Saakashvili] had disavowed any intention of carrying out 
such an action during the few days that the constitution permitted it between the 
legislative and presidential elections.”100 
In May 2013, GD announced that Deputy Prime Minister Giorgi Margvelashvili 
would run for president under the GD party. Later that month, former Prime Minister 
Ivane “Vano” Merabashvili, a “UNM official and possible presidential candidate, was 
arrested on charges of corruption, embezzlement, and abuse of office. Several members 
of [the U.S.] Congress raised concerns that the arrest was politically motivated and could 
harm Georgia’s democratization and trans-Atlantic aspirations.”101 That being said, on 
November 17, 2013, Margvelashvili was inaugurated as president, having attained 
62.1 percent of the vote,102 thus “ending a tense year of power-sharing between 
Saakashvili and Ivanishvili. Ivanishvili voluntarily resigned from office after the 
presidential succession, and Georgia’s legislature on November 20, 2013 confirmed Irakli 
97 Nichol, Georgia [Republic]: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests, 6–8. 
98 Skorupska and Zasztowt, “Georgia’s Local Government Reform,” 2. 
99 Nichol, Georgia [Republic]: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests, 6–8. 
100 Ibid., 8. 
101 Ibid., 9. 
102 “The World Factbook: Georgia,” under “Government.” 
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Garibashvili as his replacement.”103 According to many outside observers, it appears that 
Georgia is creating a political environment where one party is predominant, and that 
competitive party democracy is in decline. Furthermore, while it appears that the 
Georgian government has become less pro-American, it is still pro-European.104 
F. MILITARY 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Georgia’s military was virtually non-
existent. In 1991, Georgia’s Land Forces and National Guard made up the preponderance 
of the Georgian Army; however, equipment and training had long since been neglected. 
In an effort to resurrect its armed forces, the Georgian government pursued financial 
assistance and training from foreign nations, notably the United States. However, owing 
in part to the volatility of the situation after the Soviet break-up, initial defense reforms 
were slow to implement. By 2004, the Georgian government had begun implementing a 
wide array of structural reforms designed to enhance civil-military relations, including 
the appointment of a civilian defense minister “to head a ministry increasingly staffed by 
civilians.”105 Since then, coordination between security-related ministries has increased 
accordingly, and issues pertaining to defence policy, budget expenditures, and human 
rights of members of the armed forces have been systematically identified and 
corrected.106 
In 2005, the Georgian Parliament ratified the first National Security Concept 
(NSC) of Georgia, a document which outlines “the nation’s fundamental values, interests, 
threats, risks, and challenges . . . and provide[s] the major directions for national security 
policy as well as its foreign, social, and economic policy priorities.”107 According to 
Georgia’s current NSC (published in 2011), Georgia’s top threats, risks, and challenges 
are the “occupation of Georgian territories by the Russian Federation and terrorist acts 
103 “The World Factbook: Georgia,” under “Government.” 
104 Nichol, Georgia [Republic]: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests, 9. 
105 Nichol, Georgia [Republic] and NATO Enlargement, 2. 
106 Ibid. 
107 Ministry of Defense of Georgia, Strategic Defense Review 2013–2016, Tbilisi, Georgia, 2013, 
http://www.mod.gov.ge/documents/yzqhgsgsreeng.pdf, 12. 
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organized by the Russian Federation from the occupied territories,” and the “risk of 
renewed military aggression from Russia.”108 The 2011 NSC further states, “the Russian 
Federation, using its political and economic leverages, continues to inhibit Georgia from 
acquiring modern western defensive equipment,” and that “one of Russia’s key strategic 
objectives remains to gain and maintain control over regional energy sources and 
distribution networks.”109  In this regard, the Georgian military has since shifted its 
methodology from a capabilities-based approach to a threat-based approach.110  
By early 2009, in accordance with Georgia’s defense plan (Minister’s Vision 
2009), Georgia began implementing reforms designed to increase the military’s 
interoperability with NATO forces and contribute to NATO-led collective security 
operations such as ISAF. To accomplish this, the Georgian government addressed 
“deficiencies in military intelligence, air and maritime defense, joint force 
interoperability, special forces (including to support ISAF), and combat service 
support.”111 Additionally, Georgia began an intense campaign to re-equip and modernize 
its armed forces “with Western-made or upgraded conventional weapons, armor, 
aviation, and electronic equipment.”112 
According to Minister’s Vision 2013–2014, the Ministry of Defense (MoD) 
reaffirmed these goals and pledged to “improve its capabilities to protect the 
independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of Georgia [and] to participate in 
international operations.”113 The MoD also “declared a light infantry unit for the 
Operational Capabilities Concept Evaluation and Feedback Programme [OCC E&F] with 
the aim of eventual contribution to the NATO Response Forces [NRF].”114 Additionally, 
108 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, National Security Concept of Georgia, 2011, 
http://www.mfa.gov.ge/index.php?lang_id=ENG&sec_id=12, 7–10. 
109 Ministry of Defense of Georgia, Strategic Defense Review 2013–2016, 16. 
110 Ibid., 4. 
111 Nichol, Georgia [Republic] and NATO Enlargement, 2. 
112 Ibid. 
113 Ministry of Defense of Georgia, Minister’s Vision 2013–2014, Tbilisi, Georgia, 2013, 
http://www.mod.gov.ge/documents/Ministers%20Vision%20Eng.pdf, 3. 
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the MoD began pursuing the goal of developing and retaining a professional and 
motivated officer corps by not only emphasizing “the education, training, career 
management and social care of the GAF [Georgian Armed Forces],”115 but also by 
gradually transitioning away from the current pay-by-position system towards a pay-by-
rank system.116  
According to Georgia’s Strategic Defense Review 2013-2016 (SDR 2013–2016) 
(published in 2013), the major challenge that Georgia continues to face is its defence 
budget.  Hindrances to increasing Georgia’s defense budget include “the absence of 
sufficiently qualified personnel, inefficiencies within the acquisition system and 
organizational and structural shortfalls.”117 To correct these deficiencies, Georgia plans 
“to develop a multi-year, programme-based Defence budget including execution and 
control procedures, to ensure the resources that are needed to man, equip, train and 
sustain the GAF are used in an efficient and effective manner. These improvements 
include necessary improvements to current defence acquisition and procurement 
systems.”118 In 2012, Georgia spent approximately 2.88 percent of its GDP on defense119 
(more than any European NATO member). However, in real terms, Georgia’s 2012 
defense budget was only $451 million, which places Georgia’s defense spending well 
below that of the majority of NATO Allies.120 While Georgia’s 2014 and 2015 defense 
budgets increased in real terms by 9 percent and 7 percent, respectively, Georgia’s 
defense expenditures remained at 2.2 percent and 2.1 percent of GDP, respectively.121 
As regards organizational reform, in 2004, Georgia’s interior ministry troops were 
integrated into the armed forces. By 2007, the General Staff command system had 
115 Ministry of Defense of Georgia, Minister’s Vision 2013–2014, 3. 
116 Ibid., 5. 
117 Ministry of Defense of Georgia, Strategic Defense Review 2013–2016, 7–8. 
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119 Ibid., 27. 
120 “Financial and Economic Data Relating to NATO Defence,” NATO, February 24, 2014, 
http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_topics/20140224_140224-PR2014–028-Defence-
exp.pdf. 
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transitioned to a joint command staff as well. Two years later, “remaining elements of the 
Coast Guard—largely decimated during the Russia-Georgia conflict—became part of the 
border guards, organizationally under the Interior Ministry.”122 In 2010, the Georgian Air 
Force was merged into the Georgian Land Forces and renamed the Army Air Section, 
whereas one year later, Georgian naval forces were incorporated under the Interior 
Ministry with the Coast Guard.123 According to the SDR 2013–2016, in order “to 
improve command and control, better optimize the allocation and use of resources, 
enhance training, maintain repair and sustainment and improve combat readiness,”124 the 
MoD plans to establish East and West Operational Commands (each with separate 
intelligence and medical battalions), as well as an Air Operations Command and an Air 
Defense Command. Additionally, a new logistics management concept will be 
implemented in order to better support these new commands.125 Furthermore, the MoD 
has also recommended that the Georgian Armed Forces be renamed the Georgian 
Defence Forces and that the Joint Staff be reorganized as a General Staff.126 
As of 2013, Georgia maintained the smallest military among those of the three 
South Caucasus states, with approximately 20,650 troops serving in the ground forces, air 
force, and National Guard. Additionally, Georgia maintains 6,300 Interior Ministry 
troops and 5,400 border and coast guards. According to the SDR 2013–2016, Georgia’s 
ground forces consist of “five infantry, two artillery, one engineer, one air defence and 
one aviation brigades [sic] and other separate units.”127 “Most of the ground forces and 
air force personnel are on contracts, with the remainder conscripted.”128 While efforts 
have been made since 2009 to replace military conscription with voluntary enlistment, 
including improvements to living conditions, pay, and social benefits designed to 
122 Nichol, Georgia [Republic]: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests, 14. 
123 Ibid. 
124 Ministry of Defense of Georgia, Strategic Defense Review 2013–2016, 27. 
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increase retention rates for officers and specialists,129 conscription remains in effect in 
Georgia. Military conscription starts at 18 years of age,130 and brings with it a 12-month 
service obligation.131 
129 Nichol, Georgia [Republic] and NATO Enlargement, 5. 
130 “The World Factbook: Georgia,” under “Military.” 
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III. U.S. STRATEGIC INTERESTS 
This chapter discusses U.S. strategic interests in Georgia.  It is organized as 
follows: financial assistance, security assistance, Georgia’s military contributions, and the 
U.S.-Georgia Charter on Strategic Partnership. 
A. FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE 
Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the United States has been Georgia’s 
single largest financial donor. Beginning with the Freedom Support Act, signed by 
President George H. W. Bush in October 1992, the United States began offering financial 
assistance to the South Caucasus States in order for them to become less dependent on 
Russia. Since 1992, the United States has provided approximately $3.37 billion in aid to 
Georgia. This includes funding for Assistance to Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia 
(AEECA) and Agency budgets, “Foreign Military Financing (FMF), International 
Military Education and Training (IMET), Global Health Programs (GHP), International 
Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE), and Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, 
Demining, and Related Programs (NADR) assistance.”132 According to a CRS study, 
also included are “Section 1206 (to train and equip forces for counterterrorism and 
operations in Afghanistan) and other Defense Department, and agency and program 
funding (although some classified funding may not be reported).”133 These figures have 
dropped in recent years—$85.49 million in fiscal year (FY) 2012, $67.168 million in 
FY2013, $56.747 million (estimated) in FY2014, and $53.566 million (requested) in 
FY2015.134 However, Georgia nevertheless continues to rank among the top world states 
in terms of per capita U.S. aid, signifying Georgia’s strategic importance to the United 
States.135 
132 Nichol, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, 63. 
133 Ibid., 45. 
134 Ibid., 63. 
135 Ibid., 42. 
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In January 2004, Congress appropriated funds for a new global assistance 
program, the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), which was designed to reduce 
poverty in countries that met certain criteria, such as economic freedom, investment in 
social programs, and an ongoing democratization process.136 On September 12, 2005, the 
Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) signed a five-year, $295.3 million agreement 
(compact) with Georgia with the overall objective of reducing poverty in remote 
Georgian regions. According to the MCC, these funds would allow Georgia to 
“rehabilitate key regional infrastructure, thus improving transportation for regional trade, 
ensuring a reliable supply of energy, and regional and municipal service delivery[, and 
to] . . . develop regional enterprises by funding investment and technical assistance and 
by increasing productivity in farms, agribusinesses and other enterprises to increase jobs 
and rural income.”137 In the aftermath of the 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict, the MCC 
authorized an additional $100 million “to cover shortfalls in the original budget for the 
Projects and allow completion of the Projects as originally contemplated by the 
Compact.”138 
According to the MCC, as of June 2011, Georgia had constructed a 217 kilometer 
road through the Samtskhe-Javakheti region, rehabilitated 22 sites on Georgia’s South 
Gas Pipeline, and completed water supply projects for 5 towns. The completion of these 
projects not only reduced travel time for local farmers from eight hours to two hours, but 
also improved the security of Georgia’s gas supply in several cities. Additionally, over 
$26.8 million was invested in small and medium-sized Georgian enterprises to provide 
long-term risk capital and technical assistance to regions outside of Tbilisi, as well as in 
grants and technical assistance to farmers and agribusinesses. According to the MCC, 
136 Nichol, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, 43. 
137 Millennium Challenge Cooperation, “Agreement: Georgia Compact Summary,” The United States 
of America, September 12, 2005, http://assets.mcc.gov/agreements/georgia_compact_summary.pdf, 1. 
138 Millennium Challenge Cooperation, “First Amendment to the Millennium Challenge Compact 
between the United States of America Acting Through the Millennium Challenge Corporation and the 
Government of Georgia,” The United States of America, November 20, 2008, 
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since June 2011, this has resulted in an increase of over $16.8 million in gross revenues 
for Georgians.139 
On July 26, 2013, the MCC signed an additional $140 million agreement with 
Georgia with the overall objective being “to support strategic investments in general 
education, technical and vocational education and training and higher education that will 
strengthen the quality of education in Georgia, with an emphasis on science, technology, 
engineering, and math (“STEM”) education.”140 To accomplish this, the Georgian 
government will “(a) improve general education quality in Georgia through: infrastructure 
enhancements to the physical learning environment in schools, training for educators and 
school managers, and support to classroom, national and international education assessments; 
(b) strengthen the linkage between market-demanded skills and the supply of Georgians with 
technical skills relevant to the local economy; and (c) support delivery of high-quality STEM 
degree programs in Georgia.”141 As of March 2015, the Final Status Report for these 
projects has not been published. 
In addition to MCC funding, the European Commission (EC) and the World Bank 
co-hosted a donors’ conference in Brussels on October 22, 2008.  The purpose of this 
conference was to reaffirm support for Georgia in the aftermath of the 2008 Russia-
Georgia conflict and to garner funds for Georgia’s rebuilding. In total, thirty-eight 
countries and fifteen international organizations pledged $4.55 billion in aid to Georgia 
for the 2008–2010 period.  Of this money, the United States pledged a two-year, 
$1 billion aid package “to assist internally displaced people, rebuild infrastructure, restore 
economic growth, and sustain investor confidence in the Georgian economy as well as 
foster continued democratic reform and energy security.”142 According to Nichol, 
additional EC and WB goals were to address “budgetary shortfalls; loans, equity, and 
139 Millennium Challenge Cooperation, “Final Status Report: Georgia Compact,” The United States 
of America, June 2011, http://assets.mcc.gov/documents/qsr-2010002030605-georgia.pdf, 1–2. 
140 Millennium Challenge Cooperation, “Millennium Challenge Compact Between The United States 
Of America Acting Through The Millennium Challenge Corporation And Georgia,” The United States of 
America, July 26, 2013, http://assets.mcc.gov/agreements/compact-georgia-ii.pdf, 1. 
141 Ibid., 2. 
142 Department of State, “U.S. Pledges $1 Billion for Georgia at Donors’ Conference,” October 22, 
2008, http://2001–2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2008/oct/111151.htm. 
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guarantees to the banking sector; and core investments in transportation, energy, and 
municipal infrastructure that will boost economic growth and employment.”143 
B. SECURITY ASSISTANCE 
In 2002, the United States implemented a $64 million security program known as 
the Georgia Train and Equip Program (GTEP). Under GTEP, the United States “provided 
training to 200 officers, some 2,000 soldiers, and a small number of Interior (police) 
Ministry troops and border guards.”144 According to the U.S. Defense Department, the 
GTEP aimed to help Georgia “‘to resist pressure to allow the Russian military to pursue 
Chechen rebels’ into Georgia, help it combat terrorists inside the country, and block those 
trying to infiltrate Georgia.”145 The United States also provided military equipment and 
weaponry, such as communications and medical gear, small arms, and uniforms. In 2004, 
GTEP was discontinued; however, two years later, the United States launched the 
Sustainment and Stability Operations Program (SSOP). SSOP was created in order to 
provide training for 7,800 Georgian troops, “in part to support U.S.-led coalition 
operations in Iraq, along with advisory assistance for defense reforms and maintenance 
for previously supplied helicopters.”146 
In the aftermath of the 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict, the U.S. European 
Command (EUCOM) began a comprehensive, multi-month assessment of Georgia’s 
Armed Forces, and determined that not only were Georgia’s military capabilities severely 
damaged, but also “in practically all areas, defense institutions, strategies, doctrine, and 
professional military education were found to be seriously lacking.”147 According to 
General James Cartwright, then the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the 
United States pledged to focus on the “self and internal defense”148 of Georgia, and that 




147 Nichol, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, 46. 
148 James Cartwright, during visit to Georgia (March 2009), quoted in Nichol, Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
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equipment transfers would be based on requirements for Georgia’s homeland defense. 
Similarly, according to then-Assistant Secretary of Defense Alexander Vershbow, the 
United States pledged to focus on “building defense institutions, assisting defense sector 
reform, and building the strategic and educational foundations that will facilitate 
necessary training, education, and rational force structure design and procurement.”149 
In December 2011, President Obama signed the National Defense Authorization 
Act (NDAA) for FY2012, which called on the Secretary of Defense to submit a plan to 
Congress “for the normalization of U.S. defense cooperation with Georgia, including the 
sale of defensive weapons.”150 Based on this NDAA, the United States began supplying 
defensive weapons to Georgia, including highly mobile multi-wheeled vehicles 
(HMMWVs), mine resistant ambush protected (MRAP) vehicles, night vision devices, 
rifle scopes, and radios. According to Vershbow, the United States is “assisting Georgia 
to move along the path to having modern, western-oriented, NATO-interoperable armed 
forces capable of territorial defense and coalition contributions.”151 
In April 2012, President Obama signed an additional NDAA that stated that 
“there were two pillars of U.S.-Georgia defense cooperation: U.S. support for 
modernizing Georgia’s armed forces; and U.S. support for Georgia’s contributions to 
ISAF.”152 According to this NDAA, discussions were underway for Georgia to not only 
purchase air and coastal surveillance radar, acoustic systems, and small arms 
ammunition, but also to enhance defense cooperation in the areas of “air and coastal 
surveillance and defense training, train-the-trainer instruction for non-commissioned 
officers, brigade command and staff training, combat engineer training, and utility 
helicopter training.”153 Additionally, the United States dedicated funds for the rebuilding 
of Georgia’s Coast Guard, to include three patrol boats, a maritime information center, 
and the construction of a ship repair facility. According to a March 2013 statement by 
149 Alexander Vershbow, testimony to the U.S. Congress (August 2009), quoted in Nichol, Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, and Georgia, 46. 
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Admiral James Stavridis, USN, then the EUCOM Commander, Georgian troops had not 
only received “training for non-commissioned officer development, maritime interdiction 
operations, visit/board/search/seizure, search and rescue, maritime law enforcement, and 
environmental protection,”154 but had also “supported Armenian-Georgian training on 
cross-border Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response [HADR].”155 
C. GEORGIA’S MILITARY CONTRIBUTIONS 
Following the terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001, 
President George W. Bush quickly secured a pledge from the Georgian government 
(among other nations) to support U.S. forces in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM 
(OEF) in Afghanistan. Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) in Iraq followed in 2003. 
Initial Georgian support included over-flight rights and the use of a Georgian airbase, as 
well as other support, such as Georgian assistance in the rebuilding of Iraq.156 Over time, 
Georgia became a major transit route for cargo to and from Afghanistan. At its peak, 
Georgia’s key Black Sea port of Poti was “responsible for as much as 30% of cargoes 
being transported through the Northern Distribution Network.”157 In 2009, then-Georgian 
Defense Minister Vasil Sikharulidze re-confirmed Georgia’s commitment to facilitate 
shipments of material to Afghanistan “within the framework of cooperation with 
NATO.”158 In 2013, General William Fraser, then the Commander of U.S. 
Transportation Command (TRANSCOM), stated that Poti would continue to serve as a 
strategic transportation hub during ISAF’s drawdown.159 
In 1999, Georgia began dispatching military personnel as peacekeepers to Kosovo 
in support of the NATO-led KFOR mission. Although at the peak level Georgian forces 
in Kosovo numbered only 182 personnel, Georgia had nonetheless begun demonstrating 
that it was a willing partner in coalition operations. In August 2003, Georgia began 
154 Nichol, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, 48. 
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dispatching combat forces to Iraq in support of OIF. By 2008, Georgian troops in Iraq 
numbered approximately 2,300 (the third largest number of troops, after the United States 
and the United Kingdom). However, following the 2008 Russian-Georgia conflict, which 
cost the lives of 160 Georgian military personnel, Georgia pulled out all of its troops 
from both Kosovo and Iraq.  
In August 2004, Georgia began deploying combat forces to Afghanistan in 
support of ISAF. In 2009, the United States introduced the Georgia Deployment 
Program-ISAF to deploy Georgian forces alongside U.S. Marines in Afghanistan.160 “On 
November 16, 2009, Georgia sent 173 troops for training in Germany before their 
scheduled deployment at the end of March 2010 to support ISAF. These troops were 
boosted to 925 in mid-2010.”161 By October 2012, the Georgian government deployed an 
additional battalion of 749 troops to Afghanistan, bringing Georgian troop levels to 1,560 
by October 2013. The following year, EUCOM “expanded the Georgia Deployment 
Program to train and deploy two battalions every six months to ISAF’s Regional 
Command Southwest.”162 According to then-Georgian Defense Minister Irakli Alasania, 
“Georgian troops will remain beyond 2014 to assist the Afghan National Security 
Forces.”163 Furthermore, “as capabilities improve, the Georgian forces will operate 
independently, and a Georgian training group will be created that can largely take over 
from the Marine trainers.”164  
As of December 16, 2014, the Georgian military had approximately 750 military 
personnel deployed to Afghanistan, making Georgia the largest non-NATO contributor to 
the RESOLUTE SUPPORT mission (ISAF’s follow-on mission). Some of these troops 
serve under German command as a rapid-reaction force, with the remaining forces 
serving as base security personnel under U.S. command at Bagram Air Base. According 
160 Nichol, Georgia [Republic]: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests, 31. 
161 Nichol, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, 6. 
162 Ibid., 48. 
163 Irakli Alasania, quoted in Nichol, Georgia [Republic]: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests, 
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to Georgia’s Minister of Defense, Mindia Janelidze, “this mission helps our country to 
get closer to [the] North-Atlantic Alliance and enhance interoperability with NATO.”165 
D. U.S.-GEORGIA CHARTER ON STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP 
On January 9, 2009, the United States and Georgia signed the U.S.-Georgia 
Charter on Strategic Partnership (herein referred to as “the Charter”). According to the 
Charter, the United States and Georgia “share a vital interest in a strong, independent, 
sovereign, unified, and democratic Georgia.”166 Built on the principle of Georgia’s 
commitment to Euro-Atlantic integration, the Charter was designed to increase 
cooperation in areas such as defense and security, economics, trade, energy, 
democratization, and cultural exchanges. Politically, the Charter reaffirmed the U.S. 
strategic interest in Georgia and sought “to counter perceptions that the United States 
(and the West) had acquiesced to increased Russian dominance in the South 
Caucasus.”167 
While the Charter did not provide specific U.S. security guarantees to Georgia, it 
expanded the scope of ongoing defense and security cooperation programs to include 
enhanced training and equipment for Georgian forces. According to the Charter, one of 
the United States’ primary goals is to increase Georgia’s military capability and capacity 
in order to not only reinforce Georgia’s candidacy for NATO membership, but also to 
increase the security of the United States, Georgia, and the South Caucasus region. While 
not specifically stated in the Charter, it is reasonable to infer that the purpose of these 
program enhancements is to be prepared to counter potential threats to Georgia’s 
sovereignty and territorial integrity from other regional actors, including Russia.168 
In addition to defense and security, the Charter was also designed “to enhance job 
creation and economic growth, support economic/market reform and liberalization, 
165 Joshua Kucera, “Georgian Troops Begin New Mission in Northern Afghanistan,” Eurasianet.org, 
December 16, 2014, http://www.eurasianet.org/node/71396, 6. 
166 Department of State, “United States-Georgia Charter on Strategic Partnership,” January 9, 2009, 
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167 Nichol, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, 7. 
168 “United States-Georgia Charter on Strategic Partnership,” under Section II. 
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continue to improve the business climate, and improve market access for goods and 
services.”169 To accomplish this, the United States pledged to assist Georgia with post-
war reconstruction and financial stabilization, to combat poverty, and to improve 
Georgia’s health and education systems. Additionally, the United States and Georgia 
agreed to pursue both a Free-Trade Agreement (FTA) and an Enhanced Bilateral 
Investment Treaty (BIT). In terms of Georgia’s energy market, the United States agreed 
to assist Georgia with increasing energy production, enhancing efficiency, and increasing 
the “physical security of energy transit through Georgia to European markets.”170 To 
accomplish this, the United States promised to increase cooperation with both Azerbaijan 
and Turkey, thereby enabling the development of a new Southern Corridor. In doing so, 
both Georgia and Europe as a whole would be able to diversify their supplies of natural 
gas.171 
In terms of democratization, the United States and Georgia also agreed “to work 
together to strengthen [Georgia’s] media freedom, parliament, judicial reform, the rule of 
law, civil society, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and anti-
corruption efforts.”172 To accomplish this, Georgia promised to not only increase the role 
of independent media and objective news, but also to reinforce freedom of expression. 
Additionally, the United States and Georgia agreed to increase the education and training 
of judges, prosecutors, defense lawyers, and police officers, and to help foster 
constructive relations among these actors. In doing so, “transnational criminal threats 
such as terrorism, organized crime, trafficking in persons and narcotics, money 
laundering, and cyber crime”173 would be mitigated. With respect to democratization, 
Georgia agreed to increase political pluralism “by encouraging the development of 
political parties, think tanks, and non-governmental organizations.”174 Georgia also 
agreed to promote executive and legislative transparency and accountability by not only 
169 “United States-Georgia Charter on Strategic Partnership,” under Section III. 
170 Ibid., under Section III.3. 
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172 Ibid., under Section IV. 
173 Ibid., under Section IV.2. 
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increasing public access to government deliberations, but also by “strengthen[ing] the 
capacity of Georgian civil society to develop and analyze public policy, advocate on 
behalf of citizen interests, participate in the legislative process, and provide oversight of 
public officials.”175 
It is also worth mentioning that the U.S.-Georgia Charter is “similar to a U.S.-
Ukraine Charter signed in December 2008 and a U.S.-Baltic Charter signed in 1998 with 
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.”176 
175 “United States-Georgia Charter on Strategic Partnership,” under Section IV.5. 
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IV. GEORGIA’S PROSPECTS FOR NATO MEMBERSHIP 
This chapter discusses Georgia’s prospects for NATO membership. It is 
organized as follows: a brief overview of the 1995 Study on NATO Enlargement, 
Georgia’s motivations for and progress toward potential NATO membership, and issues 
hindering Georgia’s potential NATO membership. 
A. 1995 STUDY ON NATO ENLARGEMENT 
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO found itself without an enemy. 
Faced with a question of relevancy, throughout the 1990s, NATO sought to redefine itself 
based on its two remaining mandates—preventing the revival of nationalist militarism 
and serving as a security framework for broadening European political integration. 
NATO thus began laying the foundation for “a larger, pan-European security 
architecture.”177 In an effort to increase dialogue with Eastern European, Central Asian, 
and Mediterranean nations, NATO established the North Atlantic Cooperation Council 
(NACC) in 1991, followed by the Mediterranean Dialogue three years later. With the 
establishment of NATO’s PfP program in 1994, a program designed to not only increase 
cooperation and transparency between NATO and non-NATO countries in areas such as 
policy-making, peacekeeping, crisis management, and humanitarian efforts, but also to 
assist countries aspiring to NATO membership with implementing democratic and 
military reforms,178 it became evident that NATO was seeking to expand its presence 
eastward into the post-Communist space. 
In 1995, NATO published the Study on NATO Enlargement. According to this 
study, “NATO views security as a broad concept embracing political and economic, as 
well as defence, components.”179 This study further states that “such a broad concept . . . 
must be built through a gradual process of integration and cooperation brought about by 
an interplay of existing multilateral institutions in Europe, such as the EU, WEU 
177 “A Short History of NATO,” under “A Short History of NATO.” 
178 Ibid., under “Be Careful What You Wish For.” 
179 “Study on NATO Enlargement,” under Chapter 1.a.1. 
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[Western European Union] and OSCE [Organization for Security and Co-operation in 
Europe], each of which would have a role to play in accordance with its respective 
responsibilities and purposes in implementing this broad security concept.”180 In this 
regard, by encouraging and supporting goals such as democratic reforms, including 
civilian and democratic control over the military, and by emphasizing cooperation, 
consensus building, common defense, and transparency in defense planning and military 
budgets, NATO enlargement would (in theory) improve overall security in the Euro-
Atlantic area.181 
According to the 1995 Study on NATO Enlargement, there are no rigid criteria for 
achieving NATO membership. Rather, all that is ultimately required for enlargement is 
consensus among the existing members that the accession of a new ally “will contribute 
to security and stability in the North Atlantic area.”182 However, with any enlargement, 
the Alliance must continue to maintain military credibility in not only collective defense, 
but also in command structure, conventional forces, nuclear forces, force structure, 
intelligence, finance, and interoperability. Additionally, the Alliance must ensure that all 
military obligations, including those under Article 5, are satisfied in a timely manner, 
while taking into account the ever-changing strategic environment. Moreover, NATO 
itself will make decisions on enlargement on a case-by-case basis, and these decisions are 
not subject to veto by any nation outside the Alliance.183 
While there are no rigid criteria for NATO enlargement other than consensus 
among the existing members, there are certain political and military conditions that can 
hinder or prevent membership accession. Politically, a prospective member must 
demonstrate “a commitment to and respect for OSCE norms and principles, including the 
resolution of ethnic disputes, external territorial disputes including irredentist claims or 
internal jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means.”184 Additionally, prospective members 
180 “Study on NATO Enlargement,” under Chapter 1.a.1. 
181 Ibid., under Chapter 1.a.3. 
182 Ibid., under Chapter 1.b.7. 
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must show “a commitment to promoting stability and well-being by economic liberty, 
social justice and environmental responsibility . . . , [establish] appropriate democratic 
and civilian control of their defence force . . . [, and undertake] a commitment to ensure 
that adequate resources are devoted to achieving . . . [NATO] obligations.”185 
With respect to operational capabilities, potential members must be able to 
“contribute militarily to collective defence and to the Alliance’s new missions, . . . adapt 
themselves to the fact that NATO’s strategy and force structure are designed to exploit 
multinationality and flexibility . . . [, and comply with] over 1200 agreements and 
publications.”186 Considering that NATO’s ability to operate in a multi-national 
environment is largely dependent on standardization, “commonality of doctrines and 
procedures, interoperability of command, control and communications and major weapon 
systems, and interchangeability of ammunition and primary combat supplies”187 must 
also be pursued. “Although national participation in standardization is optional, there are 
a number of areas, such as communication and information systems and measures to 
facilitate reinforcements where military necessity requires participation.”188 
B. GEORGIA’S MOTIVATIONS FOR AND PROGRESS TOWARD 
POTENTIAL NATO MEMBERSHIP 
With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Georgia was faced with the task of 
building itself into a post-Soviet democratic nation; however, as mentioned previously, 
its military was virtually non-existent. Owing in part to financial assistance provided by 
the United States, Georgia gradually began to reduce its reliance on Russia and increase 
its security ties with the West. However, between 1992 and 1995 Georgia had to deal 
with secessionist conflicts in the Abkhazia and South Ossetia regions. In 1994, at the 
same time that NATO and Russia were beginning a formal dialogue, Georgia joined 
NATO’s PfP program. While Georgia’s initial commitment to cooperate with NATO was 
a step in the right direction, its democratic and economic reforms were inadequate, and 
185 “Study on NATO Enlargement,” under Chapter 5.b.72. 
186 Ibid., under Chapter 5.d.75–77. 
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those that did occur were largely negated by secessionist conflicts. Georgia nonetheless 
officially withdrew from the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) in 1999 
and assumed full control from Russia over guarding its sea and land borders.189 That 
same year, Georgia began sending peacekeepers to serve in the NATO-led KFOR.190 
In 2002, at the NATO Summit in Prague, Georgia began formal discussions 
regarding its aspiration to become a NATO member. These discussions accelerated 
following Georgia’s 2003 “Rose Revolution,” which brought about the democratic 
election of Mikheil Saakashvili as president. Under Saakashvili, Georgia began taking 
concrete steps toward decentralization, democratization, and defense reorganization; 
however, these reforms were not always successful.191 In June 2004, “a Special 
Representative of the NATO Secretary General was appointed to encourage democratic 
civil-military relations, transparency in defense planning and budgeting, and enhanced 
force inter-operability with NATO.”192 Later that year, NATO signed an Individual 
Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) with Georgia. According to Nichol, the IPAP “allowed 
the Alliance to provide more assistance on domestic reforms, including defense 
institutional and policy reforms and political reforms. After extensive public debate, the 
Georgian government approved a national security concept in late 2005 that committed 
the country to carry out the reforms outlined by the IPAP.”193 In August 2004, Georgia 
offered military support to NATO operations in Afghanistan with ISAF.194 
Throughout 2005 and 2006, Georgia generally met all the NATO–prescribed 
reform priorities and timelines; however, at the 2006 NATO Summit in Riga, much to the 
dismay of the United States, Georgia was not offered a Membership Action Plan (MAP). 
Rather, NATO “reaffirmed support for an ‘Intensified Dialogue’ to assist Georgia in 
189 Nichol, Georgia [Republic]: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests, 14. 
190 Nichol, Georgia [Republic] and NATO Enlargement, 1. 
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implementing reforms.”195 In 2007, the U.S. Congress approved the NATO Freedom 
Consolidation Act, under which the United States designated Georgia as “eligible to 
receive security assistance under the program established by the NATO Participation Act 
of 1994.”196 More importantly, however, the NATO Freedom Consolidation Act urged 
NATO to extend a MAP to Georgia.197 Unfortunately, owing in part to President 
Saakashvili’s resignation in 2007 over concerns regarding the government’s suppression 
of demonstrations and closing of some media, NATO member states turned down 
Georgia’s request for a MAP at the 2008 NATO Summit in Bucharest, Romania.198 
According to the Bucharest Summit Declaration, “NATO welcomes Ukraine and 
Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations for membership in NATO. We agreed today that 
these countries will become members of NATO . . . MAP is the next step for Ukraine and 
Georgia on their direct way to membership. Today we make clear that we support these 
countries’ applications for MAP.”199 
In 2008, Saakashvili was re-elected as the President of Georgia.200 According to a 
poll held at the same time as the presidential election, 77 percent of Georgians believed 
that Georgia should join NATO. Additionally, “the majority of opposition parties also 
supports [sic] Georgia’s eventual accession to NATO.”201 As this wording implies, not 
all parties shared this policy objective. According to Irina Sarishvili (who ran as a losing 
candidate in the January 2008 presidential election), “Russia would retaliate against 
Georgian membership in NATO by never permitting Georgia to peacefully regain 
authority over Abkhazia and South Ossetia.”202 Moreover, according to Nichol, “some 
195 Nichol, Georgia [Republic]: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests, 15. 
196 Ibid., 16. 
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Georgians oppose joining NATO because they allege that the Alliance will condition 
membership on Georgia accepting the independence of the separatist regions.”203 
Four months after the 2008 Bucharest Summit, Russia invaded Georgia and 
destroyed much of its military infrastructure. Russia’s subsequent recognition of the 
breakaway Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states led 
many Western and Georgian observers to claim that “NATO’s failure to offer Georgia a 
MAP [at the April 2008 NATO summit had] emboldened Russia’s aggressiveness toward 
Georgia . . . Others consider that NATO’s pledge that Georgia eventually would become 
a member, as well as Georgia’s ongoing movement toward integration with the West, 
spurred Russian aggression.”204 In both cases, NATO member states raised “heightened 
concerns that Georgia was not ready to be granted a MAP because of the destruction of 
much of its military infrastructure by Russia, the uncertain status of the breakaway 
regions, and the uncertain quality of conflict decision-making by Georgia’s political and 
military leadership.”205 According to Nichol, the 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict 
“necessitated both a fundamental shift in Georgia’s defense strategy to accentuate 
territorial defense and at least partial changes in the assistance provided by NATO 
allies.”206 
While the 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict postponed Georgia’s prospects for NATO 
membership, it also revitalized NATO’s involvement with Georgia. In September 2008, 
the NATO-Georgia Commission (NGC) was formed. Three months later, NATO offered 
Georgia an Annual National Program (ANP). Both of these steps were designed to help 
Georgia move toward eventual NATO membership.207 The following month, the United 
States and Georgia signed the U.S.-Georgia Charter on Strategic Partnership. According 
to Georgian military analyst Irakli Sesiashvili, “Georgia’s prospects for joining NATO 
have significantly improved thanks to the signing of this charter . . . After the USA 
203 Nichol, Georgia [Republic] and NATO Enlargement, 6. 
204 Ibid., 3. 
205 Nichol, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, 50. 
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commits to ensuring our country’s security and tries to settle relations with Russia at the 
political level, it [Georgia] will very quickly meet the relevant standards . . . In such a 
situation, Europe will simply not be able to say no to Georgia joining NATO.”208 
Since the 2008 Russian-Georgia conflict, Georgia has continued to transform its 
Armed Forces. Georgia’s defense reform objectives within the Planning and Review 
Process (PARP) have facilitated improved financial management in the Ministry of 
Defense (MoD), assisted in reforming the intelligence structure of the armed forces, and 
ensured that a credible SDR was conducted which incorporated lessons learned from the 
2008 Russia-Georgia conflict.209 With assistance from NATO and the United States, 
Georgia has continued to increase the military’s interoperability with NATO forces and 
contribute to NATO collective security and operations. Additionally, Georgia has 
continued to re-equip and modernize its armed forces with Western-made or upgraded 
conventional weapons, armor, aviation, and electronic equipment. In April 2010, Georgia 
began contributing to NATO’s Operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOR. Later that year, NATO 
initiated the first annual Military Committee meeting with Georgia and opened a NATO 
Liaison Office in Tbilisi.210 
Georgia’s conduct of transparent and peaceful parliamentary and presidential 
elections in October 2012 and October 2013, respectively, were welcomed as concrete 
steps towards meeting Euro-Atlantic standards. While NATO “Secretary General Anders 
Fogh Rasmussen praised Georgia for making progress in meeting conditions for NATO 
membership, including by increasing freedom of expression, economic growth, and 
military reforms, and by combating corruption,”211 at the Lisbon, Chicago, and Wales 
NATO Summits (2010, 2012, and 2014, respectively), Georgia was not offered a MAP. 
According to the 2014 Wales Summit Declaration, 
Georgia’s relationship with the Alliance contains the tools necessary to 
continue moving Georgia forward towards eventual membership. Today 
208 Sesiashvili quoted in Nichol, Georgia [Republic] and NATO Enlargement, 6. 




                                                 
we [NATO] have endorsed a substantial package for Georgia that includes 
defence capacity building, training, exercises, strengthened liaison, and 
enhanced interoperability opportunities. These measures aim to strengthen 
Georgia’s defence and interoperability capabilities with the Alliance, 
which will help Georgia advance in its preparations towards membership 
in the Alliance.212 
While the goal of eventual Georgian membership has been consistently reaffirmed, the 
reluctance of the Alliance to offer Georgia a MAP suggests that NATO member states are 
generally unwilling to provoke conflict with Russia. 
C. ISSUES HINDERING GEORGIA’S POTENTIAL NATO MEMBERSHIP 
In his 2014 article entitled “Georgia’s Path to NATO,” Damon Wilson contends 
that, “today, many allies remain ambivalent about future enlargement. The current 
aspirants—Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Macedonia, and Montenegro—all face 
serious challenges.”213 For Georgia, these challenges include its unresolved territorial 
disputes in Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia, its faltering 
democratization, and its need for additional defense reforms. Additionally, ongoing 
events in Ukraine have demonstrated that Moscow’s current leadership is unwilling to 
permit continued NATO enlargement into the post-Communist space, and that any future 
attempt at NATO enlargement will be accompanied by an increase in Russian aggression. 
Unfortunately for Georgia, this is a risk that many NATO member states are currently 
unwilling to accept. When combined with recurrent secessionist campaigns in the United 
Kingdom and Spain,214 the implications for the Eurozone of the results of the 2015 Greek 
Parliamentary elections,215 and the U.S. pivot to the Asia-Pacific,216 it would appear 
overall that there is little political willingness among NATO and EU member states to 
face off militarily against Russia. 
212 NATO, “Wales Summit Declaration,” par. 93, last accessed January 28, 2015, 
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Wilson further reports that, “disturbingly from Tbilisi’s perspective . . . most 
policymakers within the Alliance accept the inevitability of states of the Western Balkans 
joining the Alliance. However, despite the commitment at the 2008 NATO Bucharest 
summit that Georgia will become a member, many allied capitals harbor deep suspicions 
about whether this statement is credible.”217 While there are no rigid criteria for NATO 
membership, consensus among existing members is required,218 a goal not easily 
achieved in Europe’s current geopolitical climate. What this implies is that, in effect, 
Georgia’s prospects for achieving NATO membership have less to do with its ongoing 
disputes and domestic reforms than with the willingness of NATO member states to 
accept additional risks and responsibilities. Thus, the question becomes, at what point 
will NATO member states be willing to accept the risks and duties associated with 
Georgia joining the Alliance? 
1. Georgia’s Unresolved Territorial Disputes in Abkhazia and the 
Tskhinvali Region/South Ossetia 
In August 2008, four months after NATO refused to offer Georgia a MAP at the 
Bucharest Summit, Russia invaded Georgia and quickly defeated the Georgian 
military.219 According to Georgia’s State Strategy on Occupied Territories: Engagement 
through Cooperation (herein referred to as “Georgia’s State Strategy”), Russia has since 
increased its military presence “in and beyond the two occupied regions [of Abkhazia and 
the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia], including areas that were [previously] under 
Georgian government control.”220 Among these territorial encroachments was Russia’s 
temporary border expansion into Abkhazia (allegedly to increase security during the 2014 
Winter Olympics221) Russia’s ongoing construction of fences along the borders of 
217 Wilson, “Georgia’s Path to NATO,” 2. 
218 “Study on NATO Enlargement,” under Chapter 1.b.7. 
219 Nichol, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, 8. 
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Cooperation, January 27, 2010, http://www.government.gov.ge/files/225_31228_370287_SMR-Strategy-
en.pdf, 5. 
221 Nichol, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, 8. 
 45 
                                                 
Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia,222 and Russia’s deployment of border 
guards from the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (FSB) along the 
administrative boundary lines of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.223 
In addition to territorial encroachments, Moscow also vetoed the extension of the 
United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) and hindered consensus on 
extending the OSCE’s military monitoring in Georgia.224 More recently, in November 
2014, Moscow and the de-facto government of Abkhazia signed the Treaty on Alliance 
and Strategic Partnership,225 a move that further complicated “the peaceful reintegration 
of the occupied territories into Georgia’s constitutional ambit,”226 and, as some observers 
contend, foreshadows Moscow’s future intention to formally annex Abkhazia (and South 
Ossetia). According to the National Security Concept of Georgia, when combined with 
“the presence of Russian military forces in the occupied Georgian territories, and the 
construction and strengthening of military bases there, [Russia has, in effect,] create[d] a 
staging-ground for provocations and a bridgehead for a possible renewed military 
aggression.”227 Through its actions, Moscow has made apparent its intention to prevent 
Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic integration and to “forcibly return Georgia to the Russian 
political orbit.”228 
Since the 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict, Georgia has taken concrete steps toward 
achieving the peaceful withdrawal of Russian forces and the reintegration of Abkhazia 
and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia, including “engage[ment] with the occupying 
power [Russia], within the framework of the Geneva process.”229 In order to “promote 
interaction among the divided populations of Georgia . . . and to ensure that residents of 
222 “NATO Criticises Russia for Expanding its Border into Georgia,” EurActiv.com, February 6, 
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Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia enjoy the rights and privileges 
available to every citizen of Georgia,”230 and in keeping with Georgia’s State Strategy, 
the Georgian government created the Action Plan for Engagement (herein referred to as 
‘Action Plan’). According to this Action Plan, the Georgian government will pursue “four 
dimensions of engagement—humanitarian, human, social and economic—that encompass 
a comprehensive range of programme areas, with projects falling under one or more 
programmes.”231 Among these program areas are humanitarian relief, natural disasters, 
inter-community relations, preservation of cultural heritage and identity, free flow of 
information, human rights, youth activities, education, healthcare, environment, trade, 
joint production, communications, and infrastructure.232 
Additionally, “seven instruments will enable the activities the Action Plan 
promotes and serve the projects created under it. These instruments exemplify the 
bottom-up approach of the Action Plan, which rests on grassroots initiatives.”233 Among 
these instruments are the establishment of a “status-neutral liaison mechanism (LM) to 
facilitate communication among the Government of Georgia, the authorities in control in 
Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia and voluntary associations operating 
in there,”234 the creation of the Neutral Identification Card (NIC) and Travel Document, 
which allows “residents of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia greater 
access to social services and freedom of movement,”235 and the establishment of a trust 
fund “to provide grants to implementing organisations operating in Abkhazia and the 
Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia and across the division lines.”236 Additionally, Georgia 
will establish a joint investment fund (JIF) to better “support businesses that promote local 
economic development, generate employment and build commercial ties between 
230 Government of Georgia, State Strategy on Occupied Territories, 3. 
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communities on both sides of the division lines,”237 a cooperation agency (CA) “to enable 
and facilitate interactions across the division lines,”238 and a financial institution (FI) 
“that will allow for accounts setup and maintenance, cash transfers and other legal 
transactions,”239 as well as Integrated Social-Economic Zones (ISEZ) to create demand 
for cross-border goods and services.240 
In terms of specific actions that have been taken to improve the economic 
situations of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia, the Georgian 
government has since enhanced cross-border trade “through the creation of logistical and 
legal conditions for access to markets and goods, as well as through financial 
incentives.”241 Additionally, the Georgian government has improved agricultural and 
agribusiness productivity through the creation of special economic zones (SEZs), and has 
increased access to “technologies, knowledge, and finance in key fields [, such as 
agriculture], and established incentives for joint business activities to foster the creation 
of value-added businesses.”242 Additionally, by encouraging the sale of products from 
Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia to domestic, regional, and 
international markets, the Georgian government has not only increased cross-border 
employment opportunities, but has also raised production standards and product quality 
to internationally-accepted levels. 
As regards infrastructure and health care, the Georgian government has 
undertaken a campaign to not only repair existing roads, telecommunications, and supply 
lines of water in Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia, but also to repair or 
construct additional schools, hospitals, and housing facilities to meet the needs of the 
those populations. Moreover, by establishing cross-border bus connections in and around 
these regions, the Georgian government has ensured easier access for the populations of 
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these regions to receive health care in the rest of Georgia. In this regard, the Georgian 
government has also made certain medical programs available “to the residents of 
Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia, including programs for vaccination, 
response to pandemics, maternity and childcare, and the prevention and treatment of 
tuberculosis, HIV/AIDS, hepatitis, and drug abuse.”243 Additionally, efforts are 
underway to ensure that social security and other benefits are available to residents of 
these regions.244 
In terms of education, the Georgian government is working to ensure that 
education is made available in the native languages of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 
While Georgian textbooks have been made available for the Georgian-speaking 
populations in these regions, additional textbooks are being developed in both Abkhaz 
and Ossetian languages, as well as in Russian.245 Furthermore, Abkhaz- and Ossetian-
language training has been made available in Georgian schools and universities,246 and 
one thousand English-language instructors have been provided throughout these 
regions.247 Moreover, efforts are underway to not only ensure that populations of the 
regions are able to pursue education in the rest of Georgia (should they so desire), but 
also to ensure that residents of these regions are able to participate in “international 
education and exchange programs available to citizens of Georgia, as well as Georgian 
presidential grants and other state programs.”248 This includes laptops being offered to all 
first grade students under Georgia’s “one laptop per child” program. Through its increase 
of cross-border youth activities, such as sports tournaments, summer camps, and 
concerts, as well as its creation of youth grant programs and youth leadership programs, 
the Georgian government has made evident that it aims to bring Georgia’s future leaders 
together from across the dividing lines.249 
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As regards the protection of human rights, the Georgian government is not only 
“facilitating the work of human-rights activists and groups”250 in Abkhazia and the 
Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia, but also promoting “protection of the civil and political 
rights of the populations expelled from Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region/South 
Ossetia, as well as those currently residing in these territories.”251 Additionally, Georgia 
has created mechanisms to monitor and prevent human rights violations in these regions. 
According to Georgia’s State Strategy, “given the established facts of ethnic cleansing 
targeting Georgian communities, special concern will be focused on the violation of the 
rights of ethnic Georgians.”252 Moreover, the Georgian government has invited 
international organizations to help ensure the successful implementation and monitoring 
of these goals.253 
In terms of legal and administrative measures, the Georgian government created 
the legal basis and administrative mechanisms to not only facilitate economic and trade 
activities between Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia and the rest of 
Georgia, but also to ensure that appropriate international travel documents are issued for 
the populations of these regions. Additionally, the Georgian government has begun 
certifying birth, death, marriage, and education-related documents.254 In an effort to 
increase the free-flow on information between Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region/South 
Ossetia and the rest of Georgia, the Georgian government has not only increased usage of 
mass media, but also continue to promote relations among journalists through regularly 
scheduled meetings and relaxed border crossing procedures for journalists.255 
Furthermore, the Georgian government has supported the introduction of Abkhaz- and 
Ossetian-language radio broadcasts, and has provided a “joint web portal for 
communication and social networking between divided communities.”256 In doing so, the 
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Georgian government hopes “to counter division and isolation, share perspectives, and 
build understanding among communities.”257 
As regards people-to-people ties, the Georgian government is also pursuing an 
increase in “interaction between Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia and 
the rest of Georgia; in particular, [by] promot[ing] and facilitat[ing] confidence-building 
measures among war-affected populations.”258 This includes increased interaction 
between interest groups, “former combatants, neighbors, mixed families, youth, co-
workers, scholars, and voluntary associations,”259 as well as communities exiled by 
Russia. Moreover, the Georgian government has sought to protect and develop Georgia’s 
cultural heritage by preserving not only Georgian language, arts, tradition, and literature, 
but also those of other ethnic groups in Georgia, to include the populations in Abkhazia 
and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia. In this regard, the Georgian government passed 
legislation making the Abkhaz language (in combination with Georgian) one of the state 
languages of Abkhazia. Additionally, “by easing travel for clergy and the transport of 
religious articles across the division lines,”260 the Georgian government has begun setting 
the framework for the free exercise of religion.261 
While progress toward achieving the peaceful withdrawal of Russian forces and 
the reintegration of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia in Georgia has 
indeed been made, the independence of these regions remains nonetheless contested. 
While critics contend that Georgia’s ongoing territorial disputes create a roadblock for 
Georgia’s potential NATO membership, history has demonstrated that NATO 
membership can still be achieved under similar circumstances. NATO decisions 
regarding the accession of West Germany into the Alliance in 1955 set the precedent for 
granting NATO membership to an aspiring nation with unresolved territorial disputes.262 
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Wilson has pointed out that “the zones of Germany formerly occupied by American, 
British, and French forces became the Federal Republic of Germany and a founding 
member of the Alliance. Despite this division, leaders of the Federal Republic of 
Germany like Konrad Adenauer did not sacrifice the commitment to a united 
Germany.”263 Turkey and Greece also achieved NATO membership even though the two 
were involved (and are still involved) in conflict with one another. Moreover, Spain 
obtained membership in NATO even though the status of Gibraltar was disputed—and 
has yet to be settled to the mutual satisfaction of London and Madrid—and both the 
United Kingdom and Spain have been undergoing secessionist movements for decades in 
Scotland and Catalonia, respectively.264 While Georgia’s situation is by no means exactly 
parallel to any previous situation—and the list goes on—NATO has shown an ability to 
maintain a flexible approach toward new membership accession as regards unresolved 
conflicts. 
As previously mentioned, according to the 1995 Study on Enlargement, “there is 
no explicit official requirement that any disputes must have been settled before an 
invitation to join can be extended.”265 Rather, a nation must be actively engaged in 
conflict resolution.266 Considering the flexibility that NATO has in its decision-making 
process, Wilson contends that “a democratic Georgia that otherwise meets the standards 
of NATO membership could be welcomed into the Alliance with the understanding that 
Article 5 and the Washington Treaty would not be applicable to the occupied territories 
of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Alliance members would continue to recognize Georgia’s 
territorial integrity.”267 However, Wilson adds, “many believe that Georgia’s 
membership in NATO is simply not viable as long as Russian forces occupy Georgian 
territory . . . Until Russia’s occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia ends, . . . the 
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Alliance would be importing an inevitable conflict.”268 In this regard, given the recent 
increase in Russian aggression in Ukraine, it would appear that NATO is in no hurry to 
grant Georgia membership regardless of whether or not Georgia resolves its ongoing 
territorial disputes. 
2. Georgia’s Faltering Democratization and Need for Additional Defense 
Reforms 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Georgia’s military and political leaders 
faced a difficult task. In 1991, Georgia’s military was virtually non-existent, having long 
been neglected. Thanks to financial assistance and training provided by foreign nations, 
notably the United States, Georgia gradually began to engage in a wide array of structural 
reforms; however, these reforms were slow and suffered constant setbacks.269  
By 2003, the Georgian government and MoD had begun a major campaign to 
overhaul Georgia’s outdated defense policies. The result of this campaign was the 
composition of several key planning documents, to include the National Security 
Concept, the Threat Assessment Document, the National Military Strategy, the Strategic 
Defense Review, and the Minister’s Vision. Cumulatively, these documents—based 
largely on existing U.S. policies—“defined the main tasks for the Georgian army as 
achieving compatibility with NATO standards, acquiring the capacity for providing 
assistance to civil-political authorities in post-crisis rehabilitation and maintaining law 
and order, and, last but not least, acquiring the capacity for carrying out peace support, 
military operations and antiterrorist operations.”270 While these documents were a major 
step toward reforming Georgia’s military, they were not solutions in and of themselves. 
As a nation, Georgia faced threats very different from those confronting the majority of 
NATO and EU member states. According to Kríz and Shevchuk, “the probability that its 
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territory [could] be attacked [was] much higher than in other parts of Europe.”271 In this 
regard, the solutions that Georgia needed would take time to achieve. 
Unfortunately, time was not on Georgia’s side, as witnessed by the 2008 Russia-
Georgia conflict. This conflict cost the lives of over 500 Georgian soldiers. The majority 
of Georgia’s military equipment was destroyed, as was the morale of its armed forces. 
While loss of equipment is easily measurable, loss of morale is not. As the Georgian 
government and MoD came to terms with their nation’s defeat, and the possibility of 
obtaining Alliance membership quickly disappeared, Georgia’s priorities for defense 
reform shifted accordingly. Prior to the 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict, Georgia’s defense 
policy “was oriented to territorial defence, deterrence of potential aggression and 
international expeditionary operations.”272 However, “the Russian-Georgian conflict 
highlighted the importance of . . . strengthening the capability of the Georgian army to 
defend the homeland against direct aggression.”273 As the MoD actively pursued (and 
received) foreign military investment, which served to offset equipment losses incurred in 
the conflict, it also began dedicating a significantly larger portion of its annual budget to 
personnel expenditures—approximately 58.5 percent in 2009.274 These increased annual 
personnel expenditures have since continued, demonstrating the commitment of the 
Georgian government and MoD to form more professional armed forces. 
According to Wilson, “since the 2008 war, Georgia has been an ‘A+’ NATO 
student.”275 Since 1992, the Georgian government and MoD have received billions of 
dollars in foreign aid and equipment, much of which has been used to better train and 
equip the Georgian armed forces and further develop Georgia’s defensive capabilities. 
Additionally, Tbilisi has placed a much stronger emphasis on attaining NATO 
membership and ensuring NATO interoperability. This commitment to attaining NATO 
membership is evident in Georgia’s continued support for NATO-led operations, 
271 Kríz and Shevchuk, “Georgian Readiness for NATO Membership,” 94. 
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275 Wilson, “Georgia’s Path to NATO,” 1. 
 54 
                                                 
including a “caveat-free deployment in NATO’s post-International Security Assistance 
Force (ISAF) Afghanistan mission.”276 Given Georgia’s current and ongoing defense 
reforms, its commitment to achieving NATO interoperability, and its continued support 
from other nations, notably the United States, Georgia’s prospects for NATO 
membership (in terms of defense capabilities) do not appear to be a major issue. 
However, according to Kríz and Shevchuk, “when assessing the readiness of a 
country to join NATO, political criteria are [generally] given priority to military 
criteria.”277 Politically, Georgia has come a long way; however, the Georgian 
government continues to struggle with corruption. Moreover, embezzlement, abuse of 
power, and politically-motivated arrests remain commonplace. In 2003, accusations of 
electoral fraud prompted the overthrow of President Eduard Shevardnadze in what would 
later be called the Rose Revolution. In 2007, Georgia’s first democratically-elected 
president, Mikheil Saakashvili, resigned due to domestic and international criticism 
regarding a government crackdown on political oppositionists. While Saakashvili 
managed to get re-elected two months later,278 according to Zdenek Kríz and Zinaida 
Shevchuk, “Georgian opposition parties refused to recognize the result of the presidential 
election that was won by Saakashvili, calling the election rigged, and refused to 
cooperate or accept any positions in the government.”279 While the Georgian government 
took additional steps to combat corruption and ensure the smooth democratic transition of 
power, in the aftermath of the 2012 parliamentary and 2013 presidential elections, 
opposition parties once again made similar accusations.280 According to Kríz and 
Shevchuk, “on the whole, the custom of changing political power in ways that would be 
in conformity with legal and universally accepted rules has not yet become part of 
276 Wilson, “Georgia’s Path to NATO,” 1. 
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279 Kríz and Shevchuk, “Georgian Readiness for NATO Membership,” 91. 
280 Nichol, Georgia [Republic]: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests, 6–8. 
 55 
                                                 
Georgian political culture.”281 Georgia’s political culture continues to undermine its 
chances of attaining Alliance membership. 
As regards regional and local politics, the Georgian government has consistently 
taken steps toward decentralization and democratization. The government has, for 
example, consolidated Georgian territory from 1,000 small local units to 69 larger units, 
and it has made Tbilisi a self-governing city. However, owing in part to internal 
opposition, the effects of these reforms have been marginalized at the regional and local 
levels due to the Georgian government’s failure to implement corresponding financial 
reforms. According to Skorupska and Zasztowt, current reforms are only a half measure; 
in order to ensure real empowerment of the regions, the Georgian government must 
“clearly define the fiscal powers of local governments.”282 As of March 2015, there are 
no legal mechanisms in place to ensure a fair distribution of state resources. The unequal 
distribution of resources makes regional and local governments financially dependent on 
the central authorities, which, in turn, gives the central authorities leverage to persuade 
local electorates to vote for the ruling party.283 
Skorupska and Zasztowt further state that in order to pursue necessary financial 
reforms, the Georgian government must continue to coordinate with outside 
organizations, including the United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID), the German Federal Enterprise for International Cooperation (GIZ), and the 
Open Society Foundation. Through these organizations, as well as through individual EU 
member states, the Georgian government can gain access to much-needed financial 
resources and political support.284  
Poland has taken a leading role in this respect. By coordinating with 
“governmental experts, academic specialists, and representatives of Polish local and 
regional authorities,”285 the Georgian government would be able to identify the best way 
281 Kríz and Shevchuk, “Georgian Readiness for NATO Membership,” 91. 
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to utilize the financial support it receives. According to Skorupska and Zasztowt, “Polish 
experts, using their experience, can help to prepare analyses of the effectiveness of the 
financial system, the coordination of the work of different local entities (such as NGOs, 
local companies and local government), the effectiveness of the local tasks, and 
preparation of the decentralization reform promotion programme.”286 
For the Georgian government to meet the political requirements set forth in the 
1995 Study on NATO Enlargement there is still much that needs to be done. According to 
Wilson, “to be a viable NATO candidate, Georgia must continue to build credible 
democratic institutions and practices, a vibrant civil society, and an independent 
press.”287 To achieve this, 
Georgia will have to redistribute the powers of the executive and 
strengthen the mechanisms of control over it, put in place measures 
preventing the government from bullying the opposition, ensure that the 
former state television and radio stations become public entities with real 
independence, continue the reform of its judiciary and fight corruption. 
But the most important—and, at the same time, the most difficult—task 
for Georgia is to create a political culture that will make it possible that 
governments can be smoothly replaced by their opposition on the basis of 
free and fair elections whose results are accepted by both the winning and 
losing sides.288 
Given the inherent political realities of post-Soviet states, it is unlikely that democratic 
reforms such as these will happen quickly. Moreover, any political reforms that do occur 
will likely incur corresponding set-backs. What this implies is that it is unlikely that 
Georgia will soon meet NATO political requirements for membership.  
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V. CONCLUSION 
With the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991, Georgia officially 
gained its independence. However, since then, little has changed in the struggle for 
regional control. As a sovereign nation, Georgia views itself as being part of Europe, and 
believes that its only real security lies in its increased ties with the West. Since joining 
NATO’s PfP program in 1994, Georgia has made clear its intention to break from its 
Soviet (and now Russian) past, and to commit itself fully to the leading Western 
organizations, NATO and the EU. The Georgian government has therefore actively 
pursued economic, military, and political reforms. However, owing in part to political 
realities inherent in post-Soviet states, these reforms have been slow and subject to 
frequent, and sometimes externally-imposed, setbacks. 
While arguably beneficial for Georgia’s long-term security, Georgia’s Western 
aspirations have brought with them a steep price, as demonstrated by the 2008 Russia-
Georgia conflict and subsequent Russian occupation of the breakaway Georgian regions 
of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. While this conflict was devastating for Georgia (over 500 
Georgian soldiers were killed and the majority of Georgia’s military infrastructure was 
destroyed), it also marked a turning point in NATO-Russian relations, and served as a 
rude awakening to many NATO and EU member states.289 According to Skorupska and 
Zasztowt, after the 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict, 
many Western leaders concluded that the Kremlin would work to prevent 
NATO enlargement to other post-Soviet states. Russia’s more recent 
strong-arm tactics to dissuade Ukraine and other Eastern Partnership states 
from pursuing integration with the European Union (EU) indicate that 
Moscow is just as committed to obstructing further progress toward a 
Europe whole and free and preventing any more of its neighbors from 
joining the West.290 
As regards Georgia’s NATO aspirations, there is a general consensus among 
NATO member states that Georgia faces a number of significant challenges in its bid to 
289 Zinets and Madorsky, “U.S. Says Russia Must Pull Convoy.” 
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join NATO, including Moscow’s recognition of the breakaway Georgian regions of 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Georgia’s faltering attempts at democratization, and 
Georgia’s need for additional defense reforms. Additionally, there is a general consensus 
that Moscow’s current leadership has demonstrated its determination to prevent 
continued NATO enlargement into Russia’s historic sphere of influence. As a result, any 
future attempt at NATO enlargement in the post-Communist space will be accompanied 
by an increase in Russian opposition. In this regard, as observed previously, in a political 
context that features recurrent secessionist campaigns in the United Kingdom (Scotland) 
and Spain (Catalonia),291 the implications for the eurozone of the results of the 2015 
Greek Parliamentary elections,292 and the U.S. pivot to the Asia-Pacific,293 it would 
appear overall that there is little political willingness among NATO and EU member 
states to face off militarily against Russia. According to Skorupska and Zasztowt, 
“against this backdrop, many European and American policymakers are ambivalent 
about, if not cool to, the idea of further enlargement of either NATO or the EU as they 
grapple with challenges at home and see only problems among the aspirants.”294 
Given that the only real requirement for new member accession is consensus 
among NATO member states, the question is, at what point will the NATO Allies be 
willing to accept the risks and responsibilities associated with allowing Georgia to join 
the Alliance? With an increasingly aggressive Russian foreign policy threatening not only 
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of non-NATO Eastern European nations,295 but 
also Europe’s access to Russian and Azeri energy resources,296 some observers contend 
that it is only a matter of time before NATO will be forced to act, be that through 
economic, military, or political means. However, based upon Western actions in response 
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to the ongoing crisis in Ukraine, it appears that economic and political sanctions are the 
only avenues that NATO and EU member states are currently willing to pursue. For now, 
direct military action against Russia as regards Ukraine appears unlikely. However, the 
lack of Western military responses implies that as long as Russia is willing (and able) to 
pay the economic and political costs associated with its aggressive military actions 
against non-NATO and non-EU member states, Moscow, in effect, exercises a veto 
against NATO aspirants. Given the policies of most NATO Allies, barring a Russian 
attack on a NATO member, it is unlikely that the Alliance will grant Georgia 
membership regardless of the amount of support provided by the United States.  
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